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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Modeling Household Adoption of Earthquake Hazard Adjustments: A Longitudinal Panel Study 
of Southern California and Western Washington Residents. (August 2006) 
Sudha S. Arlikatti, B.Arch., Pune University; 
M.C.P., Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael K. Lindell 
 
 
 
This research, aimed at advancing the theory of environmental hazard adjustment processes 
by contrasting households from three cities in a high seismic hazard area with households from 
three other cities in a moderate seismic hazard area. It identified seven types of stakeholders 
namely, the risk area residents and their families (primary group), the news media, employers, 
and friends (secondary group), and federal, state, and local governments (tertiary group), and 
explained why they are relevant to the adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. It also addressed 
three key attributes— knowledge, trustworthiness, and responsibility for protection—ascribed to 
these multiple stakeholders and the relationships of these stakeholder attributes with risk 
perception, hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, gender, resource adequacy, fatalism and 
hazard adjustment adoption. It was specifically concerned with the effects of nested interactions 
due to trust and power differentials among the seven stakeholders, with the self reported 
adoption of 16 earthquake protective measures at two points in time (1997 and 1999).  
Some of the key findings indicate that risk perception, gender, fatalism, city activity in 
earthquake management and demographic characteristics did not significantly predict hazard 
adjustment adoption. However, all stakeholder characteristics had significant positive 
 iv 
correlations with risk perception and hazard adjustment, implying a peripheral route for social 
influence. Hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, and stakeholder knowledge, trustworthiness, 
and responsibility affected the increased adoption of hazard adjustments by households. 
Particularly important are the peer groups’ (employers, friends and family) knowledge, 
trustworthiness and responsibility.  
These findings suggest, hazard managers cannot count only on the federal, state, and 
local government advisories put out through the news media to affect community decisions and 
thereby households’ decisions to take protective actions. Instead, hazard managers need to shift 
focus and work through peer group networks such as service organizations, industry groups, 
trade unions, neighborhood organizations, community emergency response teams, faith-based 
organizations, and educational institutions to increase the knowledge, trustworthiness and 
responsibility of all in the peer group. This will assure higher household hazard adjustment 
adoption levels, thus facilitating a reduction in post disaster losses and recovery time.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background and Rationale 
The national ‘crisis atmosphere’ in the wake of the 9/11, 2001 bombings, has led to 
increased federal and state funding and research initiatives towards homeland security and the 
fight against terrorism in the United States. In comparison, even though seismic risk has become 
an increasing concern since the 1971 San Fernando earthquake with all or parts of 38 states in 
the United States lying in regions classified as having moderate to very high earthquake hazards 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 1992), the perception of a ‘crisis atmosphere’ for 
seismic risks is lacking. Traditional ways of minimizing losses in susceptible areas have 
primarily focused on three strategies: technological fixes, risk communications, and sanctions 
which have often led to repeated revisions in the building codes or conditions affecting eligibility 
for federal relief. After evaluating earthquake risks, the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction 
Act of 1977 encouraged states and local efforts to address earthquake hazards. Subsequently 
some 30 states in earthquake prone regions have established provisions governing earthquake-
resistant new construction as part of state building codes (May & Birkland, 1994).   
 Wherever there is a long and well-known history of seismic activity, the states have 
mandated planning in terms of mitigating damage from seismic events through added safety 
elements of local comprehensive land use plans (Nelson & French 2002). 
 
 
 
                                                 
 This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Journal of Community Psychology. 
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Yet the annual losses from seismic hazards have not declined appreciably over the past 
35 years because of federal policies that favor growth-inducing over growth restricting disaster 
management measures (Burby & Dalton, 1994; Burby, Cigler, French, Kaiser, Kartez, Roenigk, 
Weist, & Wittington, 1991). Although there is a general understanding that natural hazards 
impact would become less of a problem for communities if households became proactive in 
hazard mitigation and preparedness actions (Burby, French, & Nelson, 1998; Kunreuther & 
Roth, 1998; Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001), very little is actually done at the household level. 
Quite often communities are free to craft their own mitigation strategies but there are serious 
gaps in content and implementation from one community to another. In light of the limited 
federal and state role in seismic hazard mitigation, there is a growing need to target measures at 
the local government and household levels to help bridge these gaps.  Such a focus would reduce 
loss to life and property and decrease problems for community agencies that bear the burden of 
response and recovery. 
Environmental hazard managers and policy makers seek to prepare their communities 
for disasters by encouraging residents to adopt hazard adjustments (Burton, Kates, & White, 
1978). These include hazard mitigation measures providing passive protection at the time of 
disaster impact (e.g., strapped water heaters, tall furniture, and heavy objects to the building 
walls, installed latches to keep cabinets securely closed) emergency preparedness measures 
supporting active response when a disaster strikes (e.g. joined a community organization dealing 
with earthquake emergency preparedness, learned the location of nearby medical emergency 
centers) and recovery preparedness measures (e.g. purchased hazard insurance) supporting 
physical reconstruction after disaster (Lindell & Perry, 2000).  
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Lindell et al. (1997) espoused that these household hazard adjustments are linked to 
extremes in the physical environment and societal stakeholders by three dyadic relationships as 
illustrated in Fig.1. Risk of disaster impact defines the relationship between environmental 
extremes and societal stakeholders; cost defines the relationship between these stakeholders and 
hazard adjustments; and efficacy (i.e. the degree to which adjustments reduce risks) defines the 
relationship between hazard adjustments and environmental extremes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Interrelationships among environmental extremes, societal stakeholders, and hazard adjustments. 
 
 
Hazard theorists have accepted that the decision process by which households adopt and 
implement hazard adjustments occurs in stages, which include awareness of hazard, awareness 
of alternative adjustments, adoption of one or more adjustments, implementation of these 
adjustments, and evaluation (Burton, et al., 1978; Mileti, 1980; Lindell & Perry, 2004). At each 
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stage, variations in households’ adoption of hazard adjustments result from many interrelated 
variables. Most research has focused on disaster experience, risk perceptions, hazard knowledge, 
hazard salience, personality characteristics, demographic characteristics, and economic resources 
(Lindell & Perry, 2000). But researchers have paid scant attention to the effects of interactions 
between societal stakeholders - households/communities, businesses/industries, and government 
agencies (see Fig.1.) - on risk communication, protective action intentions, and protective action 
adoption, even though much of a person’s hazard knowledge, behavioral intentions, and actual 
behavior comes from social and governmental stakeholders (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Slovic, 
2000).  
To overcome this gap the research identifies the risk area resident and his/her family and 
six additional stakeholders (federal government, state government, local government, news 
media, employers, and friends). It explains how social interactions between these stakeholders 
and perceptions of three key attributes— knowledge, trustworthiness, and responsibility for 
protection—ascribed to them, affect protective action decision-making. Additionally, the 
relationships of these attributes with risk perception, hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, 
gender, resource adequacy, fatalism and a household’s decisions to adopt 16 seismic protective 
actions are explained.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The proposed research aims at comparing the extent to which households located in 
areas with different levels of seismic vulnerability vary in their adoption of earthquake protective 
measures. It also seeks to explain how perceptions of stakeholder interactions and attributes 
contribute to the stability of risk perceptions and hazard adjustment adoption behavior over time. 
Two previous studies have analyzed part of the data collected in 1997 (Lindell & Prater, 2000, 
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2002), but the follow up panel data collected during 1999 have not previously been analyzed. 
This study will thus examine the results of the two time periods to gauge the stability of 
respondents’ perceptions and identify other variables that predict households’ adoption of 
earthquake protective actions/ hazard adjustments.  
 
1.3 Organization of this dissertation 
Chapter II presents a review of hazards, public policy, psychology, and social sciences 
literature pertaining to the social amplification of risk, stakeholder inter-relationships and 
seismic hazard adjustment adoption. Chapter III presents hypotheses to be tested, describes the 
research methods, and elaborates on the measures adopted. Chapter IV presents the statistical 
analyses conducted on the two waves of data from 1997 and 1999. It includes examining the 
interitem correlations for California and Washington respondents to assess the homogeneity of 
correlations in the two states, comparing the stakeholders’ mean ratings on perceived hazard 
knowledge, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility. These analyses compare ratings of 
stakeholder characteristics, risk perceptions, seismicity/location, fatalism, adequacy of resources, 
controllability, and city activity in hazard management, between states and examine the 
correlations of these variables with household adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. The final 
chapter of this dissertation presents a summary of the analyses and the conclusions drawn, 
describes the study limitations, and offers suggestions for future research in this area. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
2.1 Framework of the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) 
Lindell and Perry (1992, 2004) conducted an extensive review of literatures in risk 
communication and protective action encompassing situations involving disaster response and 
long-term adoption of hazard adjustments. They examined a wide variety of theoretical 
perspectives and conceptual models dealing with social influence, behavioral evaluation and 
choice, attitude-behavior relationships and information seeking that guide people’s actions and 
innovations in an environmental hazard situation and developed an integrated model labeled the 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). This model characterizes the way people typically 
make decisions about adopting adjustments to protect against environmental hazards.  
The model (Fig.2) depicts a sequential process starting with the predecisional stage in 
which people first receive a warning message, pay attention to it, and comprehend its content. 
Once the predecisional processes have been successfully completed, cognitive processing is 
turned on and the five decision stages of risk identification, risk assessment, protective action 
search, protective action assessment, and protective action implementation are pursued. In 
addition, the process is also influenced by the interpretation of environmental and social context 
variables. The interpretation of the warning message is influenced by characteristics of the 
information sources and channels, message content, and receiver characteristics. 
The present study uses the PADM as the basic theoretical framework to build upon, 
adopts some variables tested extensively in the hazard mitigation literature (risk perception, 
hazard intrusiveness, and earthquake experience, demographic characteristics and social 
context), and adds some other variables that have previously received limited attention (fatalism, 
 7 
controllability, adequacy of resources, stakeholder characteristics, location, and city activity in 
earthquake hazard management) in the context of a household’s intention to adopt hazard 
adjustments. These variables used to operationalize the household hazard adjustment adoption 
process are illustrated in a conceptual model (Fig.3) and discussed briefly in the following pages. 
 
2.2. Risk Assessment 
Risk Perception 
Numerous studies have generally found significant correlations between risk perception 
and seismic hazard adjustments (Lindell & Perry, 2000). Specifically, people’s perceptions of 
greater quake likelihood (Farley, Barlow, Finkelstein, & Riley, 1993), and beliefs that they are at 
risk of death, and injury (Showalter, 1993), property damage, or disruption of their daily 
activities motivates a search for actions they can take to prevent such personal consequences. 
Kunreuther and Roth (1998) found insurance purchase was associated with perceived likelihood 
of an earthquake and subsequent damage to one’s property. However, some researchers have 
also found adjustment adoption was unrelated to expectations of future earthquake losses 
(Jackson, 1977, 1981), risk perception and hazard concern (Mileti & Darlington, 1995). 
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Fig.2. Information flow in the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). 
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Fig.3. Conceptual model of measures to operationalize a household’s adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. 
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Hazard Intrusiveness 
Hazard intrusiveness, measured as the frequency of thought, discussion, and information 
receipt about earthquakes, is important to seismic adjustment (Turner, Nigg, & Heller-Paz, 1986; 
Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1993). Mileti and Darlington’s (1995) study of the response to hazard 
awareness brochure in the San Francisco Bay area, found that information seeking was the single 
best predictor of seismic adjustments. It indicates the degree to which spontaneous thoughts or 
messages from others cause local residents to stop thinking about other tasks and focus on their 
vulnerability to a hazard.  
 
Seismic Hazard Experience 
A person’s prior seismic hazard experience is likely to influence his/her perception of 
the danger and, as such, is an important variable for study (Dooley, Catalano, Mishra, & Serxner, 
1992; Turner et al., 1986; Russell, Goltz, & Bourque, 1995). Even when people are aware of a 
hazard, they are often lulled into a false sense of security because earthquakes are so rare and, in 
addition, the demands of daily life are more pressing, thus leading to little protection motivation 
and/or adoption of hazard adjustments (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Respondents who have not 
experienced any recent earthquakes tend to procrastinate in the adoption and implementation of 
seismic hazard adjustments. In such a scenario, risk communication by the various societal 
stakeholders such as the governmental influentials, economic influentials (e.g. insurance and 
mortgage companies), and social influentials (e.g. the media and peers) can become exceedingly 
important. However, conflicting interests, low prioritization of environmental hazards, and 
difficulties in information/scientific data sharing makes sustained adoption of protective actions 
difficult to achieve. 
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2.3. Demographic Characteristics 
In their search for variables that can predict adoption of seismic hazard adjustments by 
households, some researchers have reported that adaptive action is correlated with demographic 
characteristics of the household such as gender, ethnicity, age, education level, income, 
occupation, place of residence, and presence of children in household (Turner et al., 1986; 
Russell et al., 1995; Mileti & Darlington, 1997; Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Peacock, 2003). 
Gender is a relevant variable because research has shown women tend to perceive a variety of 
risks to be greater than men do (Fothergill, 1996), but there is some evidence that they 
nonetheless adopt fewer seismic hazard adjustments (Lindell & Prater, 2000). One possible 
explanation for this result is that women might have lower levels of perceived protection 
responsibility but this possibility has not been addressed in previous research. More generally, it 
is unknown whether women differ from men in their perceptions of any stakeholder 
characteristics.  
Several studies imply that hazard adjustment adoption may also depend on community 
bondedness (Russell et al., 1995) and proximity to hazard zones (Farley et al., 1993; Kunreuther 
& Roth, 1998; Peacock, 2003; Peacock, Brody, & Highfield, 2005). Schwab, Topping, Eadie, 
Deyle and Smith (1998) found disaster impacts vary across communities or sectors within those 
communities. Some low-income communities are likely to suffer disproportionate damage due to 
the relative age of their housing stock and the limited financial capacity of many residents to 
undertake effective mitigation measures. Also, in comparison to homeowners, renters are less 
prepared to survive disasters due to incentives, disincentives and the barriers they face (Tierney, 
Lindell, & Perry, 2001; Burby, Steinberg, & Basolo, 2003).  
Although these correlations are useful in terms of their theoretical value, they have 
limited practical utility because none of them are “instrumental variables” that can be changed 
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by emergency managers. Their principal practical role would be to identify census tracts where 
additional risk communication or technical assistance might be needed (Lindell et al., 1997). 
Hence, in order to make use of these demographic predictors, there is a need to consider them in 
conjunction with other variables that can possibly be controlled by emergency planners.  
 
2.4. Other Variables 
Fatalism  
Turner et al. (1986) found fatalistic attitudes regarding earthquake impacts to be 
inversely related to adjustment adoption. Less conclusively, Farley et al. (1993) reported that 
adjustment adoption was predicted by lower fatalism ratings in a survey conducted before the 
Browning earthquake prediction date but not in a survey conducted immediately after the 
prediction date. These inconsistent correlations cannot be dismissed as being due to variations in 
the nature of the instruments and samples used. Instead, respondents’ judgments of fatalism may 
be considered as a lack of self-efficacy, which Mulilis, Duval and Lippa (1990) found to predict 
adjustment adoption. 
 
Perceived Personal Control  
Several studies have implied that receiver characteristics governed by cognitive and 
attitudinal processes are particularly important in increasing hazard awareness, thereby 
increasing hazard adjustments. Perceived controllability and level of felt responsibility (Mulilis 
& Duval, 1995), denoting to what extent one’s personal safety is determined by the actions of 
oneself or other stakeholders are important variables to be considered.  
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Perceived Resource Adequacy 
A person’s perceived lack of self-efficacy in performing a task in Mulilis and Duval’s 
(1995) person relative to event (PrE) model is equivalent to a perceived presence of 
implementation barriers such as lack of required information and skill or other resources such as 
tools and equipment and financial assets in Lindell and Perry’s (1992, 2004) PADM. Thus 
perceived resource adequacy, which summarizes the above, is also expected to be an important 
variable predicting hazard adjustment. 
 
Seismic Intensity 
 Some researchers have found locational and proximity to fault lines suggest positive 
impacts for hazard adjustments (Palm, Hodgson, Blanchard, & Lyons, 1990) and some others 
have found nonsignificant effects (Mileti & Darlington, 1997). Moreover, regions of the country 
differ in their hazard exposure, but most of the research on seismic hazard adjustment has 
focused on California where seismic experience is homogenously high and most of the 
remaining studies have taken place in the Midwest where seismic experience is homogenously 
low (Farley et al., 1993). This leaves out areas of moderate risks, making generalizability 
difficult. Hence there is a need to make comparisons to areas with moderate levels  of seismic 
hazard, especially, to make comparisons between locations that differ in their levels of seismic 
hazard (Lindell & Perry, 2000). Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the extent to which location is 
a correlate of hazard adjustment. 
 
City Activity in Earthquake Hazard Management 
 In addition, there are likely to be locational differences in stakeholder perceptions 
because local government knowledge and responsibility for seismic hazard would be expected to 
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be greater in areas where the risk is high. May and Birkland (1994) showed that city activity in 
earthquake hazard management was an important correlate to seismic hazard adjustments. 
Employing cluster analysis they identified unique groupings of cities in California and 
Washington with respect to the number of local earthquake risk reduction policies adopted and 
implemented. Their model included three sets of factors: (1) the commitment of communities to 
deal with earthquake risks, (2) local governmental capacity for addressing earthquake risks, and 
(3) the hazard context that establishes the tractability of addressing earthquake risks (May & 
Birkland, 1994). Consequently three distinct clusters namely, leading comprehensive cities, 
leading focused cities, and lagging cities were thereby labeled. Leading cities were relatively 
wealthy, rapidly growing jurisdictions that adopted greater number of measures to deal with 
earthquake hazards than the lagging cities and expended greater effort implementing them, than 
lagging cities. They concluded that within every region, be it the high risk regions such as 
California or the moderate and low risk regions such as Pacific Northwest and central United 
States, there are noteworthy differences among localities in levels of earthquake risk reduction 
that are not simply a function of variation in earthquake vulnerability. Hence, city activity in 
earthquake hazard management will be another variable considered for the present study. 
 
2.5. Seismic Policy Stakeholders and Perceived Characteristics 
Although there is a growing recognition that stakeholder participation is important to the 
hazards planning process (Godschalk, Beatley, Berke, Brower, Kaiser, 1999; Brody, 2003; 
Brody, Godschalk, & Burby, 2003), research on hazard adjustments adoption has failed to 
understand the ways in which these stakeholder interactions influence a household’s decision-
making process. Indeed, uncertainty about when (or if) environmental extremes will occur can 
cause deep division among stakeholders over the acceptability of a wide variety of risks. Hence, 
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environmental hazard managers must frequently determine what levels of perceived risk are 
acceptable to their communities and find ways to take collective actions against the unacceptable 
risks (Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, Emel, Goble, Kasperson, & Ratick, 1988; Slovic, 2000). 
In addition to collective actions that affect the entire community, environmental hazard 
managers also encourage households to take individual actions to protect themselves. An 
advantage of individual actions, such as bolting water heaters to the foundation or storing a 
three-day supply of food and water, is that each household can decide for itself what is a suitable 
level of protection from environmental extremes. Nonetheless, each household’s decisions are 
made in a social context, so it is important to understand the ways in which other stakeholders in 
their communities influence households. Many researchers argue that increasing collaboration 
amongst the stakeholders will enable better understanding of information, help generate new 
ideas for dealing with problems, and produce a sense of ownership and support for policy 
recommendations in the long run (Brody et al., 2003). 
 
Stakeholders Identified 
Multiple stakeholders - including households, businesses, governmental influentials, 
economic influentials, social influentials, and hazard professionals - influence the adoption of 
seismic hazard adjustments (Lindell et al., 1997). For this research, seven types of stakeholders 
can be identified as falling into three broad groups—households (self and family), social 
influentials, and governmental influentials (this is explained below in more detail). Households 
are important because they affect the vulnerability of a substantial amount of financial assets (in 
aggregate) by living in hazard prone areas either by conscious choice or otherwise, and by 
whether they elect to adopt pre-impact hazard adjustments. Social influentials include peers such 
as friends, employers, and the news media. Friends are sources of information and social 
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comparison (Turner, 1991), whereas employers affect the seismic safety of household members 
through hazard adjustments adopted to protect employees in the workplace where much of their 
time is spent. The news media can put environmental hazards on the public agenda and educate 
those who do not have direct experiences with disasters (Prater & Lindell, 2000). Dash and 
Morrow’s (2001) research on hurricanes in the Florida Keys found that there is a tendency for 
people to seek information primarily from radio and television to assess their personal risk, 
rather than automatically follow the advisories put out by public officials. Unfortunately, these 
information sources sometimes perpetuate disaster myths and thus impede the adoption of hazard 
adjustments (Whitney, Lindell & Nguyen, 2004). Government influentials include policymakers 
and administrators in federal, state, and local government who have extensive resources of 
knowledge and capital (although more so at the federal than at the state and local levels). In 
addition, government influentials have some legal responsibility for protecting public health and 
safety, property, and the environment within their jurisdictions. 
 
Stakeholder Interrelationships 
The interrelationships among the seven types of stakeholders can be understood in terms 
of the “onion model” (see Fig.4) adapted from Godschalk, Parham, Porter, Potapchuk and 
Schukraft’s (1994) model, highlighting the nested levels of stakeholder interactions that are key  
to planning and development of consensus building. Risk area residents and their families 
(households) are located in the primary ring; peers (friends and employers) are in the secondary 
ring; news media is in the tertiary ring, and governmental influentials (federal, state, and local 
government) are in the outermost ring.  
The interactions among stakeholders are defined by the power they wield over each 
other’s decisions to take protective actions. French and Raven (1959; Raven, 1965) posited 
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power relationships can be defined in terms of six bases of power namely reward, coercive, 
legitimate, referent, expert, and information power. Reward and coercive power are the principal 
bases of regulatory approaches, but Raven (1993) noted these require continuing surveillance in 
order to assure rewards are provided only for compliance and punishment is certain to follow 
noncompliance. Unfortunately, research has revealed state mandates are hampered by a lack of 
formal reporting or review by state officials, and limited or no penalties for failing to enforce 
their provisions (Burby, French, & Nelson, 1998; Nelson & French, 2002). Consequently, there 
is a need to better understand the ways in which households can be influenced by bases of power 
other than reward and coercion. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Stakeholder interactions related to adoption of hazard adjustments. 
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Specifically, French and Raven’s conception of expert (i.e., understanding of cause and 
effect relationships in the environment) and information (i.e., knowledge about states of the 
environment) power suggests assessing perceptions of other stakeholders’ seismic hazard 
knowledge. However, research on this topic shows most people are unrealistically optimistic 
about their hazard vulnerability (Svensen, 1981). Weinstein (1980) made this clearer by pointing 
out people believe they are better than their “average” peers. However, this does not mean they 
think they are better than all other stakeholders. Indeed, Lindell and Perry (1992) reported that 
respondents rated their own hazard knowledge as higher than that of peers and family, but lower 
than authorities such as local, state and federal government. 
Moreover, French and Raven’s conception of referent power suggests addressing the 
trustworthiness of different stakeholders. This is reinforced by Kasperson, Renn, Slovic, Brown, 
Emel, Goble, Kasperson & Ratick’s (1988; see also Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon & Slovic, 
2003) social amplification/attenuation of risk framework, which seeks to explain why “risk 
events with minor physical consequences often elicit strong public concern and produce 
extraordinarily severe social impacts” (Kasperson, et al., 1988, p. 177). A wide range of studies 
have attributed the failure of risk control efforts to lack of trust, transparency, and openness 
(Frewer, 2003) and have sought to add general requirements of a democratic society such as 
social trust (Cvetkovich & Lofstedt, 1999) to the amplification process. Further, increased trust 
between stakeholders and generates an increased probability of changing the attitudes of others 
(Maass & Clark, 1983).  
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In highlighting the importance of public trust levels Lofstedt (2004, p.337) states, 
First, past research indicates that it is much easier to destroy trust than to build 
it…. Second, research that Paul Slovic, myself, and others have done over recent 
years shows that public trust is one of the most important explanatory variables 
of the publics’ perceptions of risk (Lofstedt 1996). That is, if the public trusts 
regulators they will perceive risks to be less than when they do not trust 
regulators, In fact, there is a correlation between low public-perceived risk and a 
high level and public trust and vice-versa. In sum, as the public becomes 
increasingly distrustful, the public is increasingly risk averse. 
 
 Although trustworthiness is clearly an important stakeholder attribute, it is difficult to 
make specific predictions about differences in stakeholders’ perceived trustworthiness because 
the most relevant research—trust in institutions—has examined only a few of the stakeholders 
that are relevant to household hazard adjustment adoption. Thus, for seismic hazard mitigation 
actions at the household level, perceptions of trustworthiness of multiple societal stakeholders 
becomes a key variable. Specifically, increasing trust in these stakeholders will help to attenuate 
perceptions of risk, improve transparency and openness, and in turn increase hazard adjustment 
adoption. 
Finally, French and Raven (1959) defined legitimate power in terms of the rights and 
responsibilities associated with each role in a social network, which raises questions about what 
households consider to be the responsibility different stakeholders have for protecting them from 
seismic hazard. This is reinforced by research on stakeholders’ perceived protection 
responsibility from seismic hazard, which dates from Jackson’s (1977, 1981) research that 
attributed low rates of seismic adjustment adoption to respondents’ beliefs that the federal 
government (54%) was the stakeholder most responsible for coping with earthquakes. Much 
later, Garcia (1989) found respondents had come to believe earthquake preparedness was an 
individual’s responsibility. Her conclusion that a higher level of seismic adjustment adoption in 
her sample was due to this perception of personal responsibility is supported by Mulilis and 
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Duval’s (1997) research showing preparation for tornadoes reveals the moderating effects of felt 
responsibility.  
 
Effects of Stakeholder Characteristics 
Stakeholder characteristics could affect hazard adjustment adoption in one of two ways, 
indirect or direct. An indirect effect occurs if stakeholder characteristics influence a person’s 
acceptance of information about a hazard and hazard adjustments and this information, in turn, 
changes their behavioral intentions and actual behavior. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) describe this 
mechanism as the effect on the attitude toward the act, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) as the central 
route to persuasion, and Chaiken (1987) as systematic processing.  A direct effect occurs if 
stakeholder characteristics influence a person’s behavioral intentions and actual behavior without 
affecting their acceptance of information about the hazard and hazard adjustment. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) describe this mechanism as the effect on the subjective norm, Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986) as the peripheral route to persuasion, and Chaiken (1987) as heuristic processing. 
Lindell and Whitney (2000) found support for an indirect effect of stakeholder 
characteristics in their study of risk perceptions, perceptions of stakeholder knowledge and 
protection responsibility, and adoption of seismic hazard adjustments among students from a 
state university campus in Southern California. Their finding that two perceived stakeholder 
characteristics (hazard knowledge and protection responsibility) were significantly correlated 
with hazard adjustment intentions and actual adjustment adoption, but risk perception was not, 
supported an indirect effect. Moreover, consistent with the findings of Lindell and Perry (1992), 
these data showed mean ratings of hazard knowledge were highest for government agencies, 
next highest for self/family, and lowest for peers, but mean ratings of protection responsibility 
were highest for self/family, next highest for government, and lowest for peers. Although Lindell 
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and Whitney’s (2000) study provided useful insights into perceptions of stakeholder 
characteristics, it was limited by a small sample of 168 students from a high seismic risk area, so 
there is a need to determine if these findings generalize to more demographically diverse 
samples of respondents from communities having both high and moderate levels of seismic risk. 
In addition to perceptions of hazard knowledge (i.e., ability to provide others with hazard 
information) and protection responsibility addressed by Lindell and Whitney (2000), the present 
study examines the role of trustworthiness (i.e., willingness to provide others with accurate 
hazard information, McGuire, 1985) as an important stakeholder characteristic. 
 
2.6. Longitudinal Panel Study Design 
 In the social sciences, cross-sectional observations are the form of data most commonly 
used for assessing the determinants of behavior (Davies, 1994; Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995). 
Primarily due to data constraints, scholars and practitioners rarely examine whether perceptions 
of seismic hazards are correlated with adoption of seismic adjustments over time. However, 
perceptions can change over time depending upon various factors, especially the knowledge base 
and experiences of the community. Cross-sectional data cannot support conclusive causal 
inferences  (James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982). This is because persuasive messages received by the 
respondents can yield a number of different types of temporal effects due to decay in induced 
change, delayed action effects, and resistance to later persuasion. Longitudinal designs are 
required to overcome the inherent limitations of previous cross-sectional designs and trace the 
flow of information over time and assess its effects. Panel designs are also useful in detecting 
pseudo-opinions (Lindell and Perry, 1990). Pseudo-opinion is the term coined by Bishop, 
Hamilton and McConahay (1980) to explain the answers that people offer when called upon to 
answer questions about issues on which they had no opinion prior to being asked the question. 
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The number of persons who answer with pseudo-opinions depends on the salience of the issue at 
hand. Fewer the people who have thought about an issue, or fewer the issues thought about by a 
person, more the pseudo-opinions offered. Converse (1970) calls a similar phenomenon non-
attitudes, defined as lack of a stable affective disposition in answering survey questions, and 
pseudo-opinions as apparent expressions of opinion that do not reflect any relevant opinion. This 
is an important issue to be considered in seismic hazard adjustment processes because our 
research aims to better understand the will of households’ to take these protective actions and 
pseudo-attitudes cannot motivate action (Graeff, 2003). A better understanding of households’ 
hazard adjustment adoption process will also help to guide community actions, especially 
political legislation.  
 
2.7. Research Hypotheses 
Previous research on social influence and risk communication suggests Lindell and 
Whitney’s (2000) findings of significant correlations between stakeholder hazard knowledge and 
protection responsibility will be replicated in a larger, more diverse sample of respondents. In 
addition, these correlations are expected to extend to stakeholder trustworthiness. Specifically, 
this leads to the following three closely related hypotheses. 
H1a:  Respondents’ perceptions of all stakeholders’ hazard knowledge will be positively 
correlated with perceptions of those stakeholders’ trustworthiness. 
H1b  Respondents’ perceptions of all stakeholders’ hazard knowledge will be positively 
correlated with perceptions of those stakeholders’ protection responsibility. 
H1c:  Respondents’ perceptions of all stakeholders’ trustworthiness will be positively 
correlated with perceptions of those stakeholders’ protection responsibility. 
  
23
 
In addition, Lindell and Whitney’s (2000) findings regarding profiles (of mean ratings 
across stakeholders) for hazard knowledge and protection responsibility are expected to be 
replicated and extended to trustworthiness. Specifically, this leads to the following four closely 
related hypotheses. 
H2a: Mean ratings of hazard knowledge will be highest for government agencies, next highest 
for self/family, and lowest for peers. 
H2b:  Mean ratings of trustworthiness will be highest for self/family, next highest for the 
government, and lowest for peers. 
H2c:  Mean ratings of protection responsibility will be highest for self/family, next highest for 
government, and lowest for peers. 
H2d:  Mean ratings of protection responsibility will be lower than ratings of hazard knowledge 
for all stakeholders except self/family, which will have higher ratings for protection 
responsibility than for hazard knowledge. 
Previous research on social context, receiver characteristics and information sources 
suggests the following hypothesis. 
H3a: Respondents’ perceptions’ of self/family hazard knowledge will be significantly 
correlated with their demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, 
number of children, education, income, community tenure, and home ownership) and 
their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. 
H3b: Respondents’ perceptions’ of federal, state and local government and media 
trustworthiness will be significantly correlated with their demographic characteristics 
and with their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. 
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H3c: Respondents’ perceptions’ of self/family protection responsibility will be significantly 
correlated with their demographic characteristics and with their adoption of seismic 
hazard adjustments. 
Previous research on locational differences in disaster experience related to location and 
hazard salience suggests the following hypothesis. 
H4:  Perceptions of stakeholder characteristics will be significantly higher for respondents in 
a high seismic risk area than in a moderate seismic risk area. 
H5: Respondents in a high seismic risk area will have greater level of hazard intrusiveness, 
hazard experience, and risk perception than respondents in a moderate seismic risk area.  
Previous research on gender differences in risk perception suggests the following 
hypothesis.  
H6:  Females will have significantly higher perceptions of seismic risk and stakeholder 
characteristics. 
Lindell and Whitney’s (2000) findings on seismic risk perception, together with those of 
Mileti and Darlington (1997) suggest the following hypothesis. 
H7:  Respondents’ perceptions of stakeholder characteristics will be positively correlated 
with their hazard intrusiveness and earthquake experience and their adoption of seismic 
hazard adjustments. 
H8:  Respondents’ risk perceptions will be positively correlated with their perceptions’ of 
stakeholder characteristics, but not with their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. 
Previous research on the effects of individual belief systems, fatalism, control and choice 
on protective action behavior suggests the following hypotheses. 
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H9a: Respondents’ perceptions of fatalism (luck or chance/God’s will) will be significantly 
correlated with their risk perceptions and with their adoption of seismic hazard 
adjustments. 
H9b:  Respondents’ perceptions of perceived personal control (whose actions govern their 
personal safety in an earthquake) would be positively correlated with their adoption of 
seismic hazard adjustments. 
H9c: Respondents’ perceptions of resource adequacy (implementation barriers such as lack of 
required information and skills, or other resources such as tools and equipment, and 
financial assets) will be negatively correlated with their adoption of seismic hazard 
adjustments. 
Previous research on location and city activity in earthquake hazard management (May 
& Birkland, 1994) as important correlates to protective action behavior suggests the following 
hypotheses.  
H10a: Households in leader communities in both regions will have greater levels of hazard 
intrusiveness, perceptions of seismic hazards, and hazard adjustment adoptions than 
those in laggard communities. 
H10b: Ratings of stakeholder knowledge, trustworthiness and responsibility for protection will 
be significantly higher for respondents in leader communities than for those in laggard 
communities in both regions. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1 Respondents 
The panel data reported here are taken from a two-wave survey conducted in 1997 
(whose results were partly reported by Lindell and Prater, 2000 & 2002) and 1999. In this 
survey, Southern California and Western Washington were identified as high and moderate 
seismic hazard areas, respectively. Three cities in Southern California (Inglewood, Norwalk and 
Santa Clarita) and three others in Western Washington (Bremerton, Edmonds and Renton) were 
selected because the County and City Data Book (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994) showed 
they are diverse in household ethnicity, education, and income. Moreover, Inglewood and 
Renton were categorized as leaders in community hazard adjustment, whereas Norwalk and 
Bremerton were categorized as laggards (May & Birkland, 1994). Santa Clarita and Edmonds 
were not classified by May and Birkland (1994), but Santa Clarita was picked because it was 
stricken by the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Edmonds was selected because it had education and 
income levels that approximated those of Santa Clarita.  
The mail-out questionnaire administration procedure was consistent with Dillman’s 
(1978, 1983) Total Design Method. In 1997, the first wave of questionnaires were mailed to 300 
randomly selected addresses in each city. Those who did not respond within 10 days were sent a 
second questionnaire and this process was repeated through four mailings. A total of 561 in the 
sample of 1800 responded, but four households’ returned duplicate questionnaires that differed 
from each other, so all four pairs were deleted. This left 553 questionnaires—332 from Western 
Washington and 221 from Southern California. A total of 174 households no longer at their 
original addresses, undeliverable, or who returned incomplete questionnaires, were deleted. This 
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yielded an adjusted response rate of 34% (California: 19% in Inglewood, 23% in Norwalk, 31% 
in Santa Clarita; Washington: 37% in Renton, 38% in Bremerton, 36% in Edmonds). In 1999, 
the respondents from 1997 were sent the second wave of questionnaires. A total of 235 in the 
sample responded but two were duplicates and one incomplete, so these were deleted. This left 
232 questionnaires—141 from Western Washington and 91 from Southern California yielding a 
response rate of 41.95% for the panel (California: 31% in Inglewood, 40% in Norwalk, 47% in 
Santa Clarita; Washington: 44% in Renton, 37% in Bremerton, 45% in Edmonds). The adjusted 
percentage of female respondents in 1997 (panel respondents) was 39% = 88 and in 1999 (panel 
respondents) was 36% = 82 (after adjusting for missing values).  
The response rates are lower than desired, but lie within the 31-52% range obtained by 
Mileti and Fitzpatrick (1993). The low response rate might raise questions about sample 
representativeness and indeed, comparison of the respondents from each city to the 1994 County 
and City Data Book showed the sample slightly over-represented males, homeowners, and older 
residents, and had higher levels of education than the populations from which they were drawn 
(see Lindell & Prater, 2000, for further details). However, over-representation of some 
demographic categories will produce bias in psychological variables such as perceived 
stakeholder characteristics only to the degree the latter are correlated with demographic 
variables, but such correlations are generally low (Lindell & Perry, 2000). Moreover, reports by 
Curtin, Presser and Singer (2000), Keeter, Miller, Groves and Presser (2000), and Lindell and 
Perry (2000) indicate low response rates do not appear to bias central tendency estimates such as 
means and proportions. Lindell and Perry (2000) argued that low response rates would affect 
correlations only if the item variances were severely restricted by severe over representation of 
respondents at one end of the response distribution. This study will analyze residents’ self 
reported adoption of 16 hazard adjustments collected from this longitudinal panel data pool (N = 
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232) to assess the stability and predictive validity of variables associated with seismic hazard 
adjustment adoption.  
There were few significant demographic differences in the characteristics of the two 
geographic groups of respondents.  As indicated in Table I, there were significant differences in 
ethnicity, with Californians more likely than Washingtonians to be Black or Hispanic and less 
likely to be White.  Tables II and III show the demographic characteristics of the study sites for 
the whole sample in 1997 (N=553) and the panel respondents in 1999 (N=232) respectively. 
Finally, Table IV summarizes the comparisons between the demographic characteristics of the 
study sites for respondents in the two periods.  
 
Southern Western Significance
California Washington %
Demographic Characteristics χ2
1. Sex (female) 34.48% 37.41% 0.09
2. Hispanic ethnicity 12.09% 1.42% 9.97**
3. Asian ethnicity 5.49% 7.80% 0.17
4. Black ethnicity 8.79% 1.42% 5.61**
5. White ethnicity 58.24% 83.69% 17.19**
6. Other ethnicity 10.99% 4.26% 2.9
7. Married 75.82% 72.34% 0.19
8. Widowed 4.40% 7.09% 0.31
9. With children 37.36% 37.59% 0
10. Ownership (renter) 5.56% 7.97% 0.19
Table I. Differences Between States in Demographic Characteristics in 1999 
Panel (N=232) Data Set
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Variables % Washington 1997 % California 1997
Renton Bremerton Edmonds Average Inglewood Norwalk Santa Clarita Average
1. Average age 52 50 51 51 49 50 47 49
2. Avg. community tenure 13 13 13 13 15 16 10 14
Gender 
3. Female 46.2 36.7 35.5 39.5 45.5 50.7 39.1 45.1
4. Male 53.8 63.3 64.5 60.5 54.5 49.3 60.9 54.9
Ethnicity
5. Hispanic 0.0 1.9 1.9 1.3 22.2 35.3 6.7 21.4
6. Asian 10.4 2.8 1.9 5.0 0.0 11.8 4.5 5.4
7. Black 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.6 50.0 1.5 0.0 17.2
8. White 81.1 88.9 91.5 87.2 13.0 42.6 83.1 46.2
9. Other 7.5 6.5 3.8 5.9 14.8 8.8 5.6 9.7
Marital Status & Children
10. Married 73.5 61.5 71.7 68.9 45.3 77.6 88.9 70.6
11. Widowed 6.7 7.3 2.8 5.6 7.5 9.0 1.1 9.2
12. With children 27.8 37.3 31.3 32.1 40.9 48.3 46.8 45.3
Education
13. Less than high school 0.9 1.8 0.0 0.9 9.1 13.2 0.0 7.4
14. High school 17.8 26.6 12.0 18.8 16.4 16.2 8.9 13.8
15. Some college/vocational 36.4 42.2 35.2 37.9 30.9 41.2 34.4 35.5
16. Bachelors 32.7 16.5 31.5 26.9 23.6 23.5 37.8 28.3
17. Graduate school 12.1 12.8 21.3 15.4 20.0 5.9 18.9 14.9
Income
18. < $15,000 4.4 8.9 2.3 5.2 15.4 8.8 2.4 8.9
19. $15,000-24,999 11.0 14.9 3.4 9.8 15.4 14.0 4.8 11.4
20. $25000-34999 14.3 26.7 13.6 18.2 25.0 19.3 7.2 17.2
21. $35,000-49,999 13.2 23.8 25.0 20.7 13.5 29.8 9.6 17.6
22.  >than 50,000 57.1 25.7 55.7 46.2 30.8 28.1 75.9 44.9
Home ownership
23. Renters 7.5 18.3 12.1 12.6 33.9 6.0 3.3 14.4
24. Owners 92.5 81.7 87.9 87.4 66.1 94.0 96.7 85.6
Table II. Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sites for the Whole Sample of Respondents in 1997 (N=553)
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Variables         % Washington 1999 % California 1999
Renton Bremerton Edmonds Average Inglewood Norwalk Santa Clarita Average
1. Average age 56 53 55 55 53 56 52 54
2. Avg. community tenure 17 15 15 16 16 21 13 17
Gender 
3. Female 34.7 37.2 40.4 37.4 41.2 38.5 29.5 36.4
4. Male 65.3 62.8 59.6 62.6 58.8 61.5 70.5 63.6
Ethnicity
5. Hispanic 2.0 0.0 2.0 1.3 22.2 17.9 4.4 14.8
6. Asian 10.2 4.7 8.2 7.7 0.0 7.1 6.7 4.6
7. Black 2.0 0.0 2.0 1.3 44.4 0.0 0.0 14.8
8. White 81.6 88.4 81.6 83.9 11.1 60.7 75.6 49.1
9. Other 2.0 7.0 4.1 4.4 22.2 3.6 11.1 12.3
Marital Status & Children
10. Married 79.6 65.1 71.4 72.0 50.0 75.0 86.7 70.6
11. Widowed 6.1 11.6 4.1 7.3 0.0 10.7 2.2 4.3
12. With children 36.7 41.9 34.7 37.8 38.9 28.6 42.2 36.6
Education
13. Less than high school 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.7 111.0 11.1 0.0 7.4
14. High school 16.3 23.8 10.6 16.9 16.7 18.5 4.7 13.3.
15. Some college/vocational 38.8 50.0 42.6 43.8 27.8 37.0 41.9 35.6
16. Bachelors 36.7 21.4 25.5 27.9 33.3 22.2 34.9 30.1
17. Graduate school 8.2 4.8 19.1 10.7 11.1 11.1 18.6 13.6
Income
18. < $15,000 4.4 7.7 7.3 6.5 5.6 4.2 0.0 3.3
19. $15,000-24,999 4.4 15.4 9.8 9.9 22.2 12.5 9.5 14.7
20. $25000-34999 4.4 15.4 9.8 9.9 11.1 16.7 4.8 10.9
21. $35,000-49,999 28.9 25.6 19.5 24.7 33.3 45.8 2.4 27.2
22.  >than 50,000 57.8 35.9 53.7 49.1 27.8 20.8 83.3 44.0
Home ownership
23. Renters 4.1 14.6 8.2 9.0 11.1 3.7 4.4 6.4
24. Owners 95.9 85.4 91.8 91.0 88.9 96.3 95.6 93.6
Table III. Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sites for Panel Respondents in 1999 (N=232)
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The tables indicate that the panel respondents in 1999 were not significantly different 
from the whole sample of respondents in 1997. However, as previously reported by Lindell and 
Prater (2000) for the whole sample, families with children were over represented among the 
panel respondents. Additionally, the Californians were not significantly different from the 
Washingtonians in sex and marital status. Neither were there significant differences in age or 
education. However, both groups of respondents over-represented males and older residents and 
                           Average in 1997                           Average in 1999
Variables Washington California Washington California
1. Average age 51 49 55 54
2. Avg. community tenure 13 14 16 17
Gender 
3. Female 39.5 45.1 37.4 36.4
4. Male 60.5 54.9 62.6 63.6
Ethnicity
5. Hispanic 1.3 21.4 1.3 14.8
6. Asian 5.0 5.4 7.7 4.6
7. Black 0.6 17.2 1.3 14.8
8. White 87.2 46.2 83.9 49.1
9. Other 5.9 9.7 4.4 12.3
Marital Status & Children
10. Married 68.9 70.6 72.0 70.6
11. Widowed 5.6 9.2 7.3 4.3
12. With children 32.1 45.3 37.8 36.6
Education
13. Less than high school 0.9 7.4 0.7 7.4
14. High school 18.8 13.8 16.9 13.3
15. Some college/vocational 37.9 35.5 43.8 35.6
16. Bachelors 26.9 28.3 27.9 30.1
17. Graduate school 15.4 14.9 10.7 13.6
Income
18. < $15,000 5.2 8.9 6.5 3.3
19. $15,000-24,999 9.8 11.4 9.9 14.7
20. $25000-34999 18.2 17.2 9.9 10.9
21. $35,000-49,999 20.7 17.6 24.7 27.2
22.  >than 50,000 46.2 44.9 49.1 44.0
Home ownership
23. Renters 12.6 14.4 9.0 6.4
24. Owners 87.4 85.6 91.0 93.6
Table IV. Comparison Between Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in 
1997 (N=553) and in 1999 (N=232)
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had higher levels of education than the populations from which they were drawn. Specifically, 
93% of the southern Californian respondents had at least a high school education, and 44% had a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. Similarly, 99% of the western Washington respondents had at least 
a high school education and 38% had a bachelor’s degree or higher. The two groups also had 
non-significant differences in income, home ownership, and community tenure. However, 
homeowners were over-represented amongst respondents in California (93.6%) and Washington 
(91%). 
 
3.2. Instrument 
The survey was composed of multiple measures used to operationalize a household’s 
adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. These were classified into four broad categories as listed 
and elaborated below. 
 
Risk Assessment  
The three variables grouped in this category were risk perception, hazard intrusiveness and 
hazard experience. 
 Risk perception was measured in two ways. Personal risk was measured as a 
respondent’s judgment that an earthquake occurring in the next 10 years will cause, a) major 
damage to property in her/his city, b) major damage to his/her home, c) injury to self or 
immediate family, d) disruption to his/her job that prevents them from working, and e) disruption 
to shopping and other daily activities. These five items were measured on 5-category Likert scale 
with anchors “Not at all likely” (= 1) and “Almost a certainty” (= 5). Relative structural risk was 
measured as structural vulnerability of the respondents’ a) home and b) workplace, as compared 
to other buildings in his/her vicinity. These two items were measured on 5-category Likert scale 
  
33 
 
 
with anchors “Much less than average” (= 1) and “Much more than average” (= 5). Item 
responses for the seven questions were averaged and this seven-item scale had an acceptable 
reliability (1997 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.84; 1999 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.84). 
Hazard intrusiveness items asked how often the respondent thought about, talked to 
others about, or received information about earthquakes and ways to prepare for them. These 
three items were rated on a 1-5 rating scale whose response categories were daily (=5), weekly, 
monthly, yearly, and never (=1). Item responses were averaged to compute an index with an 
acceptable reliability (1997 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.85; 1999 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.80). 
Hazard experience was the respondents’ experience with earthquakes and addressed a) 
whether the respondent’s immediate family’s property had been damaged in an earthquake, b) 
whether the respondent or an immediate family member had been injured in an earthquake, c) 
whether the property of a friend, relative, neighbor or coworker known personally had been 
damaged in an earthquake and d) whether a friend, relative, neighbor, or coworker the 
respondent knew personally had been injured in an earthquake. Respondents’ No (= 0) or Yes 
(=1) responses were summed to compute an index ranging 0-4. The four-item scale had an 
acceptable reliability (1997 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.71; 1999 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.68). 
 
Other Variables  
The four variables grouped in this category were fatalism, perceived personal control, 
perceived resource adequacy and city activity in hazard management. Fatalism was the 
respondent’s perception of two measures namely, luck or chance, and God’s will as determinants 
of their personal safety in an earthquake. The variables were measured on 5-category Likert 
scales with anchors “Not at all” (= 1) and “Very great extent” (= 5), and responses to these two 
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items were treated separately as they did not have an acceptable reliability (1997 sample: 
Cronbach’s α = 0.48; 1999 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.39). 
Perceived personal control was the respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which their 
personal safety in an earthquake was determined by the actions of, a) themselves/family, b) 
friends, relatives, neighbors and coworkers, c) local newsmedia, d) local government and e) 
federal and state agencies. The variables were measured on 5-category Likert scales with anchors 
“Not at all” (= 1) and “Very great extent” (= 5). (Note on coding: If a respondent answered 
“yourself and your immediate family” as responsible to a very great extent (=5), it was coded as 
is. However, if a respondent coded other stakeholders high, say local government (= 5), it meant 
they had little control. In such cases, the variable was reverse scored by subtracting from 6 to 
give a value of 1. Finally, respondents’ answers to these five items were summed to compute an 
index ranging 5-25. This 5-item scale had an acceptable reliability (1997 sample: Cronbach’s α 
= 0.65; 1999 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.69). 
Perceived resource adequacy was measured by asking the respondents how certain they 
were that they had, a) all the information, b) tools and equipment, and c) financial assets (money, 
credit, insurance) needed to protect themselves against the earthquake. The variables were 
measured on 5-category Likert scales with anchors “Not at all” (= 1) and “Very great extent” (= 
5). Responses to these three items were summed to compute an index ranging from 5-15 and had 
an acceptable reliability (1997 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.76; 1999 sample: Cronbach’s α = 
0.76). 
City typology of leader or laggard was imputed to each respondent; according to the 
emergency management support provided by his or her city. This depended on the respondent’s 
city’s activity in hazard management initiatives. One dummy coded variable for the two leader 
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cities (Inglewood and Renton) and another dummy-coded variable for the two laggard cities 
(Norwalk and Bremerton) were created. 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
Nine demographic characteristics were considered. Age was a continuous variable 
indicating the respondent’s self-reported age in years. Community tenure was a continuous 
variable representing the length of time (in years) that the respondent had lived in the home they 
were in. Gender was measured as 0 for males and 1 for females. Race/ethnicity was measured by 
dummy coded variables indicating membership in one of the ethnic categories – Hispanic, Asian, 
Black, White, and Other (American Indian, mixed ethnicity, and other ethnicity). For example, 
Hispanic was measured as 1 if household was of Hispanic ethnicity and 0 if not. Married was 
measured as 1 if the respondent was married and 0 if respondent was single or widowed. 
Widowed was measured as 1 if respondent was widowed and 0 if respondent was single or 
married.  With children was measured as a 1 if the respondent had children below 18 years of 
age living in the household and 0  otherwise. Education measured the education level reported 
by the respondent from a set of 4 categories education level with response codes ranging from 1-
4 for education less than high school (=1), high school (= 2), some college/ vocational school (= 
3), college graduate (= 4), graduate school (= 5). Income measured the household income 
reported by the respondent from a set of 5 categories with codes ranging from 1-5 for income 
less than $15000 (= 1) , between $15,000-24,999 (= 2), between $25,000-34,999 (= 3), between 
$35,000-49,999 (= 4), and more than 50,000 (= 5). Homeownership was coded as 0 indicating 
homeowner and 1 representing renter. 
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Stakeholder Characteristics 
The portion of the survey questionnaire not analyzed previously by Lindell and Prater 
(2000, 2002) included measures of the seven stakeholder types on three stakeholder 
characteristics. Respondents rated the federal government, their state government, their local 
government, the news media, their employer, their peers, and themselves and their families on 
hazard knowledge, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility. (Respondents were asked to 
rate only their families, not themselves and their families, on trustworthiness). The variables 
were measured on 5-category Likert scales with anchors “Not at all” (= 1) and “Very great 
extent” (= 5).  
 
Adoption of Hazard Adjustments 
Adoption of hazard adjustments was measured by asking the respondent whether he or 
she had adopted each of 16 different hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness measures. 
These items, drawn from previous research on hazard adjustments (Lindell, 1994; Mileti & 
Darlington, 1997; Mulilis et al., 1990; Russell et al., 1995; Turner et al., 1986), fell into one of 
three categories. Emergency preparedness actions were, a) stocked at least 4 gallons of water, b) 
had a 4 day supply of dehydrated or canned food, c) had a working transistor radio with spare 
batteries, d) had a complete first aid kit, e) had a fire extinguisher, and f) wrenches to operate 
utility shutoff valves and switches. Hazard mitigation actions were g) strapping water heaters, 
tall furniture, and heavy objects to building walls, h) installed latches to keep cabinets secured, i) 
purchased earthquake insurance. Planning activities were, j) developed a household earthquake 
emergency plan, k) learned where and how to turn off utility lines, l) learned the location of 
nearby medical emergency centers, m) contacted the Red Cross or government agencies for 
information about earthquake hazard, n) attended meetings to learn about earthquake hazard, o) 
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joined a community organization dealing with earthquake emergency preparedness, and p) 
written a letter to a newspaper or a governmental official supporting action about earthquake 
hazard. Respondents’ No (= 0) or Yes (=1) answers to these items were summed to compute an 
index ranging 0-16. As reported by Lindell and Prater (2000, 2002), the 16 hazard adjustment 
items formed a scale with acceptable reliability (1997 sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.73; 1999 
sample: Cronbach’s α = 0.65). 
 
3.3. Analyses 
 Analyses were conducted on the panel of respondents for Time 1 (1997) and then 
repeated for Time 2 (1999) and compared. Mean ratings were computed for respondents’ 
perceptions of stakeholder characteristics. To help gauge whether the responses across all the 
stakeholders were in agreement, followed a uniform distribution, or were polarized, interrater 
agreement on individual items was also assessed because mean ratings near the midpoint of a 
rating scale can be quite ambiguous (Lindell & Brandt, 1999, 2000). For example a mean rating 
of M = 3.0 can result if the responses are identical (i.e., all respondents give a rating of 3), 
uniformly distributed (i.e., an equal number of responses in each of the five categories), or 
bipolar (i.e., half of the responses are 1 and the remainder are 5). These three patterns have 
radically different implications about people’s beliefs. Consequently, interrater agreement was 
assessed using r*wg,, which is +1.0 (its upper limit) when all the respondents give exactly the 
same rating, 0 when ratings are uniformly distributed over the categories, and -1.0 when the 
ratings are polarized (in rare circumstances, r*wg < -1.0, see Lindell, Brandt and Whitney, 1999). 
Tests were performed to check for pseudo-opinions
 
that is, items having r*wg values that were 
non-significantly different from zero (i.e. are not significantly different from chance responding).  
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Locational differences were assessed in two ways. First, differences due to overall 
seismic vulnerability were measured by contrasting the two states, California and Washington. 
Hazard knowledge, trustworthiness, protection responsibility, hazard intrusiveness, seismic 
experience, risk perception, gender and hazard adjustment adoption scores were initially 
intercorrelated separately for respondents from California (N=91) and Washington (N=141) in 
1997 and 1999. Following the graphical test proposed by Gnanadesikan (1977) and used by 
Lindell and Perry’s (1990) study of perceptions of radiological hazards from the Trojan nuclear 
power plant in the interval from five months before to one month after the Chernobyl accident, 
the equivalence of the patterns of intercorrelations among various stakeholder characteristics in 
these two states was assessed by taking the obtained value of each correlation for respondents of 
California and plotting it against the corresponding value of that correlation for respondents in 
Washington. For example, one data point is defined by plotting the value of the correlation 
between federal government hazard knowledge and state government hazard knowledge for the 
Southern California sample on the x-axis and the corresponding value of the correlation between 
these same two variables for the Washington sample on y-axis. Thus, the total number of data 
points is equal to the distinct correlation coefficients in the correlation matrix, k (k-1)/2 = 21 
(20)/2 =210. Additionally, t-tests were used to compare item means for respondents from 
California (higher seismic risk) and Washington (medium seismic risk). 
Second, differences in emergency management support were measured by establishing 
one dummy coded variable for the two leader cities (Inglewood and Renton) and another 
dummy-coded variable for the two laggard cities (Norwalk and Bremerton). All these tests were 
conducted for Time 1 and Time 2 and comparisons made. 
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For assessing the stability of perceptions over the two time periods, the procedures for 
testing differences between states was used, specifically, the patterns of intercorrelations among 
all the variables at Time 1 were cross-plotted against the intercorrelations among the same 
variables at Time 2. This was done by taking the obtained value of each correlation for 
respondents’ in Time1 and plotting it against the corresponding value of that correlation for 
respondents’ in Time 2. The plot was used to indicate whether the variables had similar 
correlations in both time periods. If the variables had very different correlations in the two time 
periods, this would suggest the items were measuring pseudo opinions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF WAVE-I (1997) & WAVE-II (1999) DATA 
 
4.1. Homogeneity of Intercorrelations 
The cross-plots of interitem correlations for California and Washington respondents in 
1997 and 1999 respectively, are approximately linear and have no obvious outliers, indicating a 
similar overall pattern of intercorrelations among perceptions of stakeholder characteristics in 
the two states (see Fig.5). Consequently, tests of the correlational hypotheses (H1, H3, H4, H5, 
H6, H7, H8, H9 and H10) were conducted by combining the two state subsamples to give N = 
232.  
The resulting correlation matrix for 1997 (see Table V) reveals high intercorrelations 
among perceptions of the three stakeholder characteristics with respect to each other (i.e., all 
correlations among Variables 1-7, 8-14, and 15-21 are statistically significant). In addition, 47 of 
the 49 correlations of stakeholder knowledge with stakeholder trustworthiness are significant, as 
are 32 of the 49 correlations of stakeholder knowledge with stakeholder responsibility are 
significant, and 38 of the 49 correlations of stakeholder trustworthiness with stakeholder 
responsibility. Finally, the other variables (hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, risk 
perception, location, gender and adjustment adoption) have 27 of 42 significant correlations with 
knowledge, 17 of 42 significant correlations with trustworthiness, 20 of 42 significant 
correlations with responsibility, and 9 of 15 significant intercorrelations among themselves. 
Thus, the actual number of significant correlations (190) substantially exceeds chance 
expectations (1% of 288 = 3) among all of these groups of variables. 
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Fig. 5. Cross-plot of interitem correlations for California and Washington respondents in 1997 and 1999. 
 
  
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
-0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
Southern California (1997)
W
es
te
rn
 
W
as
hi
n
gt
o
n
 
(19
97
)
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
-0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20
Southern California (1999) 
W
es
te
rn
 
W
as
hi
n
gt
o
n
 
(19
99
)
  
42 
 
 
   
Variable M SD r*
 wg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Knowledge (Kn)
1. FedKn 3.47 1.05 0.48 1.00
2. StaKn 3.68 1.01 0.49 0.75 1.00
3. LocKn 3.46 1.16 0.42 0.55 0.76 1.00
4. MedKn 3.38 1.08 0.46 0.39 0.54 0.57 1.00
5. EmpKn 3.21 1.23 0.39 0.31 0.37 0.48 0.37 1.00
6. FrdKn 2.94 0.95 0.52 0.24 0.37 0.45 0.44 0.55 1.00
7. SelKn 3.47 1.12 0.44 0.08 0.19 0.41 0.31 0.52 0.60 1.00
Trustworthiness (Tr)
8. FedTr 3.27 1.13 0.43 0.58 0.52 0.37 0.33 0.25 0.23 0.10 1.00
9. StaTr 3.56 1.10 0.45 0.49 0.62 0.52 0.47 0.31 0.33 0.24 0.82
10. LocTr 3.52 1.10 0.45 0.39 0.55 0.67 0.48 0.38 0.41 0.30 0.61
11. MedTr 3.51 1.14 0.43 0.34 0.45 0.40 0.60 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.48
12. EmpTr 3.20 1.28 0.36 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.67 0.50 0.34 0.30
13. FrdTr 3.00 1.17 0.41 0.19 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.59 0.40 0.27
14. SelTr 3.33 1.28 0.36 0.09 0.21 0.26 0.20 0.40 0.55 0.59 0.15
Responsiblility (Re)
15. FedRe 3.02 1.30 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.35
16. StaRe 3.28 1.32 0.34 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.31
17. LocRe 3.35 1.34 0.33 0.20 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.17
18. MedRe 2.69 1.29 0.36 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.05
19. EmpRe 2.91 1.37 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.33 0.15 0.18 0.02
20. FrdRe 2.45 1.16 0.42 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.22 -0.04
21. SelRe 4.15 1.16 0.42 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.39 0.08
Other variables
22.Gender 0.39 0.49 - 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09
23.Locat 0.61 0.49 - -0.02 -0.26 -0.28 -0.12 -0.17 -0.24 -0.16 0.02
24.Leader 0.29 0.45 - 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.12
25.Laggard 0.31 0.46 - 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.00
26.PerCo 16.30 4.23 - -0.14 -0.15 -0.11 -0.31 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 -0.16
27.ResAd 8.98 3.02 - 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.30 0.27 0.08
28.AcLu 2.79 1.41 - -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00
29.ActGod 2.75 1.67 - -0.04 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06
30.HazIn 2.26 0.82 - 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.14 0.27 0.03
31.HazEx 1.01 1.16 - -0.09 0.11 0.17 -0.04 0.16 0.17 0.25 -0.13
32.RiskPe 2.81 0.86 - 0.10 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.03
33.HazAd 8.24 2.88 - -0.07 -0.03 0.14 0.06 0.30 0.25 0.39 -0.05
Notes: N's ranged from 198 to 232                                                                                                                                                   
r = 0.18 or greater, significant at the 0.01 level; between r  = 0.13 and 0.17, significant at the 0.05 level.
Fed = Federal government, Sta = State government, Loc = Local government, Med = Media, Emp = Employer, 
Sel = Self/family, Gender = Female (1), Locat =  Washington (1), Leader = Leader City, Laggard = Laggard City,
PerCo = Personal Control, ResAd = Resource Adequacy, ActLu = Act of luck, ActGod = Act God, 
HazIn = Hazard Intrusiveness, HazdEx = Hazard Experience, RiskPe = Risk Perception, HazAdj = Hazard Adjustment Adoption  
Table V. Means (M) , Standard Deviations (SD),  Interrater Agreement Indices (r* wg) , and Intercorrelations (r ) amongst 
Key Variables for Panel in 1997 (N=232)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1.00
0.78 1.00
0.61 0.57 1.00
0.37 0.35 0.38 1.00
0.34 0.33 0.37 0.56 1.00
0.25 0.28 0.28 0.52 0.76 1.00
0.25 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.13 1.00
0.29 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.90 1.00
0.25 0.28 0.25 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.77 0.88 1.00
0.04 0.03 0.27 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.49 0.50 0.52 1.00
0.08 0.08 0.18 0.42 0.31 0.29 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.47 1.00
-0.02 0.00 0.06 0.22 0.40 0.29 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.53 0.48 1.00
0.22 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.29 0.24 1.00
0.15 0.07 0.14 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.13
-0.11 -0.21 -0.08 -0.12 -0.20 -0.18 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.11
0.10 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.04
0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 0.13
-0.14 -0.17 -0.24 -0.06 -0.11 -0.04 -0.41 -0.42 -0.45 -0.47 -0.24 -0.31 -0.04
0.14 0.18 0.03 0.24 0.19 0.27 -0.17 -0.16 -0.11 -0.17 0.09 0.00 0.21
0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.15 -0.03
-0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 0.05 -0.12 -0.08
0.06 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.21
-0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.19 0.30 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 0.05 -0.03 0.16
0.07 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.10
0.05 0.12 0.09 0.28 0.27 0.36 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 0.16 0.24
N's ranged from 198 to 232                                                                                                                                                   
Table V. Continued
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22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
1.00
-0.04 1.00
0.00 0.16 1.00
0.00 0.00 -0.42 1.00
-0.13 -0.05 0.04 0.02 1.00
-0.13 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.16 1.00
0.13 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 1.00
-0.10 0.05 0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.26 1.00
0.09 -0.20 -0.03 0.00 -0.18 0.21 0.04 -0.08 1.00
0.01 -0.56 -0.18 -0.16 0.10 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.32 1.00
0.19 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.35 0.16 1.00
0.01 -0.23 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.52 0.07 0.00 0.39 0.41 0.10 1.00
Table V. Continued
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 Similarly the resulting correlation matrix for 1999 (see Table VI) reveals high 
intercorrelations among perceptions of the three stakeholder characteristics with respect to each 
other  (i.e., all correlations among Variables 1-7, 8-14, and 15-21 are statistically significant). In 
addition, 47 of the 49 correlations of stakeholder knowledge with stakeholder trustworthiness are 
significant, as are 32 of the 49 correlations of stakeholder knowledge with stakeholder 
responsibility are significant, and 39 of the 49 correlations of stakeholder trustworthiness with 
stakeholder responsibility. Finally, the other variables (hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, 
risk perception, location, gender and adjustment adoption) have 22 of 42 significant correlations 
with knowledge, 20 of 42 significant correlations with trustworthiness, 14 of 42 significant 
correlations with responsibility, and 9 of 15 significant intercorrelations among themselves. 
Thus, the actual number of significant correlations (183) substantially exceeds chance 
expectations (1% of 288 = 3) among all of these groups of variables. There is also a noticeable 
simplex pattern of decreasing correlations with increasing distance from the main diagonal, 
which suggests the psychological ordering of the stakeholders in terms of increasing distance 
from the respondents is the same as the order in which they are listed in the table for both 1997 
and 1999.  
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Variable M SD r*
 wg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Knowledge (Kn)
1. FedKn 3.48 0.99 0.50 1.00
2. StaKn 3.73 0.98 0.51 0.72 1.00
3. LocKn 3.64 1.10 0.45 0.51 0.74 1.00
4. MedKn 3.49 1.15 0.42 0.45 0.53 0.58 1.00
5. EmpKn 3.21 1.18 0.41 0.40 0.48 0.39 0.41 1.00
6. FrdKn 3.00 0.90 0.55 0.26 0.37 0.46 0.37 0.49 1.00
7. SelKn 3.60 0.96 0.52 0.21 0.23 0.34 0.30 0.37 0.63 1.00
Trustworthiness (Tr)
8. FedTr 3.34 1.07 0.47 0.56 0.44 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.12 0.04 1.00
9. StaTr 3.67 0.97 0.51 0.46 0.62 0.46 0.37 0.44 0.25 0.13 0.72
10. LocTr 3.64 1.08 0.46 0.36 0.56 0.66 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.21 0.52
11. MedTr 3.61 1.17 0.42 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.52 0.39 0.24 0.15 0.44
12. EmpTr 3.13 1.29 0.36 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.72 0.36 0.23 0.44
13. FrdTr 3.01 1.15 0.42 0.18 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.32 0.44 0.30 0.26
14. SelTr 3.28 1.25 0.37 0.20 0.26 0.35 0.22 0.34 0.45 0.47 0.20
Responsiblility (Re)
15. FedRe 2.89 1.29 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.27
16. StaRe 3.22 1.27 0.36 0.12 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.15
17. LocRe 3.28 1.30 0.35 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.13
18. MedRe 2.70 1.35 0.33 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.33 0.15 0.11 -0.01 0.05
19. EmpRe 2.89 1.30 0.35 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.15 0.22
20. FrdRe 2.43 1.19 0.41 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.13 0.16
21. SelRe 4.17 1.11 0.45 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.30 0.35 0.05
Other variables
22.Gender 0.36 0.48 - 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04
23.Locat 0.61 0.49 - -0.02 -0.21 -0.27 -0.16 -0.14 -0.33 -0.30 -0.05
24.Leader 0.29 0.45 - -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.02
25.Laggard 0.31 0.46 - 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.08
26.PerCo 17.09 4.13 - -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.27 -0.19 -0.11 -0.05 -0.17
27.ResAd 9.32 3.22 - 0.13 0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.03
28.AcLu 3.02 1.60 - -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.02
29.ActGod 2.79 1.74 - -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.01
30.HazIn 2.29 0.88 - -0.06 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.17 0.07
31.HazEx 0.98 1.12 - 0.01 0.13 0.20 0.08 0.23 0.34 0.37 -0.02
32.RiskPe 2.76 0.85 - 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.05
33.HazAd 8.56 2.73 - 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.23 0.41 -0.06
Notes: N's ranged from 198 to 232                                                                                                                                                   
r = 0.18 or greater, significant at the 0.01 level; between r  = 0.13 and 0.17, significant at the 0.05 level.
Fed = Federal government, Sta = State government, Loc = Local government, Med = Media, Emp = Employer, 
Sel = Self/family, Gender = Female (1), Locat =  Washington (1), Leader = Leader City, Laggard = Laggard City,
PerCo = Personal Control, ResAd = Resource Adequacy, ActLu = Act of luck, ActGod = Act God, 
HazIn = Hazard Intrusiveness, HazdEx = Hazard Experience, RiskPe = Risk Perception, HazAdj = Hazard Adjustment Adoption  
Table VI. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD), Interrater Agreement Indices (r* wg), and Intercorrelations (r ) amongst 
Key Variables for Panel in 1999 (N=232)
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1.00
0.77 1.00
0.56 0.56 1.00
0.52 0.49 0.47 1.00
0.30 0.35 0.35 0.52 1.00
0.22 0.29 0.28 0.44 0.77 1.00
0.22 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.08 1.00
0.22 0.22 0.30 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.86 1.00
0.19 0.24 0.29 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.80 0.93 1.00
0.17 0.22 0.32 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.57 0.62 0.61 1.00
0.19 0.23 0.27 0.39 0.30 0.23 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.43 1.00
0.18 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.52 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.48 0.36 1.00
0.15 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.08 0.21 0.21 1.00
0.11 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.03
-0.20 -0.22 -0.05 -0.16 -0.23 -0.18 -0.20 -0.20 -0.16 -0.07 -0.15 -0.22 -0.08
-0.03 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.01
0.15 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.04
-0.22 -0.24 -0.30 -0.19 -0.28 -0.20 -0.37 -0.38 -0.35 -0.49 -0.25 -0.37 -0.09
0.10 0.11 0.07 0.24 0.17 0.23 -0.13 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.04 0.20
-0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.21
-0.09 -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.28 -0.08 -0.21 0.01
0.15 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.03
0.08 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.24 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.13
0.09 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.20
0.06 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.09 0.21 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.23
N's ranged from 198 to 232                                                                                                                                                   
Table VI. Continued
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22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
1.00
0.03 1.00
0.00 0.16 1.00
0.02 0.00 -0.42 1.00
-0.18 0.01 0.03 -0.04 1.00
-0.15 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 1.00
0.11 -0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.14 -0.01 1.00
-0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.23 0.11 0.24 1.00
0.14 -0.23 -0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 0.14 0.03 1.00
-0.07 -0.56 -0.19 -0.15 -0.03 0.25 0.08 -0.03 0.20 1.00
0.26 -0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.17 -0.16 0.03 -0.13 0.17 0.06 1.00
-0.02 -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.54 0.02 0.05 0.26 0.41 0.12 1.00
Table VI. Continued
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1997 Results 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, respondents’ ratings of hazard knowledge were 
positively correlated (average r = .62) with the corresponding ratings of trustworthiness. For 
example, federal knowledge had a correlation of r = .58 with federal trust, state knowledge had a 
correlation of r = .62 with state trust, and so on.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, respondents’ ratings of hazard knowledge were 
positively correlated with the corresponding ratings of protection responsibility. Thus, federal 
knowledge had a correlation of r = .32 with federal responsibility, state knowledge had a 
correlation of r = .30 with state responsibility, and so on. However, the correlations of hazard 
knowledge with protection responsibility (average r = .30) were much lower than the 
corresponding correlations of hazard knowledge with trustworthiness (average r = .62).  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1c, respondents’ ratings of trustworthiness were positively 
correlated with the corresponding ratings of protection responsibility. Thus, federal trust had a 
correlation of r = .35 with federal responsibility, state trust had a correlation of r = .29 with state 
responsibility, and so on. As was the case for the correlations of hazard knowledge with 
protection responsibility, the correlations of trustworthiness with protection responsibility 
(average r = .34) were much lower than the corresponding correlations of hazard knowledge 
with trustworthiness (average r = .62). 
 
1999 Results 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, respondents’ ratings of hazard knowledge were 
positively correlated (average r = .57) with the corresponding ratings of trustworthiness. For 
example, federal knowledge had a correlation of r = .56 with federal trust, state knowledge had a 
correlation of r = .62 with state trust, and so on.  
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Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, respondents’ ratings of hazard knowledge were 
positively correlated with the corresponding ratings of protection responsibility. Thus, federal 
knowledge had a correlation of r = .20 with federal responsibility, state knowledge had a 
correlation of r = .24 with state responsibility, and so on. However, the correlations of hazard 
knowledge with protection responsibility (average r = .28) were much lower than the 
corresponding correlations of hazard knowledge with trustworthiness (average r = .57).  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1c, respondents’ ratings of trustworthiness were positively 
correlated with the corresponding ratings of protection responsibility. Thus, federal trust had a 
correlation of r = .27 with federal responsibility, state trust had a correlation of r = .22 with state 
responsibility, and so on. As was the case for the correlations of hazard knowledge with 
protection responsibility, the correlations of trustworthiness with protection responsibility 
(average r = .33) were much lower than the corresponding correlations of hazard knowledge 
with trustworthiness (average r = .57). 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
 The results presented above indicate that the patterns of statistically significant positive 
correlations confirmed H1a-H1c in both years. In addition, however, Tables V and VI show the 
absolute values of the correlations were quite similar from one year to the next. For example, the 
correlations of stakeholder knowledge in 1997 ranged from .58 to .67. The equivalent 
correlations in 1999 ranged from .44 to .67. Similar patterns can be seen for the other 
correlations, as well. 
 
 
 
  
51 
 
 
4.2. Mean Ratings of Stakeholder Characteristics 
Fig. 6 depicts a plot of the mean ratings for stakeholder attributes - perceived hazard 
knowledge, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility- across the seven stakeholder types for 
1997 and 1999.  
 
 
 
Fig.6.  Mean ratings of perceived hazard knowledge, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility across 
seven stakeholders in 1997 and 1999.
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1997 Results 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 2a, ratings of hazard knowledge are higher for state 
(t224 = 2.52, p < .05) government than for self/family; and higher for self/family than for 
employers (t196 = -3.17, p < .05), and friends (t221 = -8.03, p < .05). Contrary to the hypothesis, 
hazard knowledge was rated as high for the federal government (t223 = 0.18, ns), local 
government (t224 = 2.52, ns) and news media (t222 = -0.85, ns) as for self/family. The data reveal 
only slight variability among government influentials; state government was rated only slightly 
more knowledgeable than federal (t225 = -4.26, p < .05) and local (t222 = 4.44, p < .05) 
government. Amongst social influentials, the news media were rated as knowledgeable as 
employers (t196 = 1.65, ns) but higher than friends (t221 = 5.96, p < .05). Interrater agreement was 
moderately high across all items (average r*wg = 0.46) and there was slightly less agreement on 
employers’ knowledge (r*wg = 0.39) than on other stakeholders. 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 2b, which predicted trustworthiness would be 
higher for family than for government, trustworthiness ratings for family were significantly 
different from those for state (t219 = 2.35, p < .05) and local (t219 = 2.15, p < .05) government but 
not for federal government (t217 = -0.47, ns). Ratings for family were significantly higher than 
friends (t217 = -5.49, p < .05) but not different from media (t219 = 1.72, ns) and employers (t198 = -
1.36, ns). Interrater agreement across all items was similar to the levels for hazard knowledge 
(average r*wg = 0.41) with the lowest level of agreement on employer and family trustworthiness 
(r*wg = 0.36).  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2c, ratings of protection responsibility are significantly 
higher for self/family than for federal (t221 = -10.13, p < .05), state (t222 = -7.94, p < .05), or local 
(t222 = -7.15, p < .05) government. In addition, ratings of protection responsibility are 
significantly lower for news media (t220 = -13.49, p < .05), employers (t197 = -11.09, p < .05), or 
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friends (t221 = -17.53, p < .05) than for the federal government level—which had significantly 
lower ratings than state (t221 = -6.07, p < .05) or local (t221 = -5.28, p < .05) government. 
Interestingly, although not hypothesized, employers had significantly higher ratings of protection 
responsibility than the news media (t196 = -2.54, p < .05) and friends (t197 = 4.55, p < .05). Unlike 
the previous two stakeholder characteristics, local government received the highest rating of any 
government level and respondents rated self/family as the most responsible of all stakeholders. 
Interrater agreement across all items was lower than that for knowledge and trustworthiness 
(average r*wg = 0.36). It was the highest for friends’ and self/family responsibility (r*wg = 0.42). 
In support of Hypothesis 2d, ratings of protection responsibility were significantly 
higher than ratings of hazard knowledge for self/family (t223 = -8.02, p < .05) and were 
significantly lower for news media (t219 = 7.12, p < .05) and friends (t219 = 5.70, p < .05). 
Smaller, but significant, differences were found for federal (t222 = 4.89, p < .05) and state (t223 = 
4.34, p < .05) government, and for employers (t190 = 2.62, p < .05). 
 
1999 Results 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 2a, ratings of hazard knowledge are higher for self/family 
than for employers (t197 = -4.93, p < .05), and friends (t221 = -10.89, p < .05). Contrary to the 
hypothesis, hazard knowledge was rated as high for the federal government (t222 = -1.32, ns), 
state government (t223 = 1.74, ns), local government (t222 = 0.28, ns) and news media (t224 = -1.27, 
ns) as for self/family. The data reveal only slight variability among government influentials; state 
government was rated only slightly more knowledgeable than federal (t221 = -4.78, p < .05) and 
local (t221 = 2.14, p < .05) government. Amongst social influentials the news media was rated 
higher than employers (t195 = 2.50, p < .05) and friends (t220 = 6.08, p < .05). Interrater agreement 
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was moderately high across all items (average r*wg = 0.48) and there was slightly less agreement 
on employers’ knowledge (r*wg = 0.41) than on other stakeholders. 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 2b, which predicted trustworthiness would be 
higher for family than for government, trustworthiness ratings for family were significantly 
different from those for state (t223 = 4.24, p < .05) and local (t224 = 3.91, p < .05) government but 
not for federal government (t223= 0.68, ns). Ratings for family were significantly higher than 
media (t223= 3.03, p < .05) and friends (t224 = -4.89, p < .05) but not different from employers 
(t194 = -1.60, ns). Interrater agreement across all items was similar to the levels for hazard 
knowledge (average r*wg = 0.41) with the lowest level of agreement on employer and family 
trustworthiness (r*wg = 0.36).  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2c, ratings of protection responsibility are significantly 
higher for self/family than for federal (t220 = -12.19, p < .05), state (t223 = -9.51, p < .05), or local 
(t221 = -8.82, p < .05) government. In addition, ratings of protection responsibility are 
significantly lower for news media (t222 = -13.23, p < .05), employers (t192 = -12.24, p < .05), or 
friends (t221 = -17.96, p < .05) than for the federal government level—which had significantly 
lower ratings than state (t223 = -7.40, p < .05) or local (t221 = -7.11, p < .05) government. 
Interestingly, although not hypothesized, employers had significantly higher ratings of protection 
responsibility than the news media (t192 = -2.63, p < .05) and friends (t193 = 4.26, p < .05). Unlike 
the previous two stakeholder characteristics, local government received the highest rating of any 
government level and respondents rated self/family as the most responsible of all stakeholders. 
Interrater agreement across all items was lower than that for knowledge and trustworthiness 
(average r*wg = 0.37). It was the highest for friends’ and self/family responsibility (r*wg = 0.45). 
In support of Hypothesis 2d, ratings of protection responsibility were significantly 
higher than ratings of hazard knowledge for self/family (t223 = -7.26, p < .05) and were 
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significantly lower for news media (t221 = 8.11, p < .05), employers (t190 = 2.84, p < .05) and 
friends (t218 = 6.96, p < .05). Similarly, significant differences were found for federal (t219 = 6.11, 
p < .05), state (t223 = 5.71, p < .05) and local (t220 = 3.96, p < .05) government. 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
 The profiles for 1997 and 1999 are very similar in appearance. In both years, mean 
ratings on hazard knowledge for self/family were as high as federal, and local government, and 
media knowledge. State government was rated slightly more knowledgeable than other 
governmental influentials. Newsmedia was rated most knowledgeable amongst the social 
influentials. Self/family was rated more knowledgeable than employers and friends. Interrater 
agreement was moderately high across all stakeholders, but slightly lower for employers’ 
knowledge than for other stakeholders. 
In addition, both years showed that mean ratings of trustworthiness for family were 
significantly lower than those for state and local government but not for the federal government. 
Trustworthiness ratings for family were significantly higher than friends. However, ratings for 
family were not different from employers. Interrater agreement was similar to knowledge and 
moderately high across all stakeholders but there was lowest level of agreement on employers 
and family trustworthiness. 
Finally, both years showed that mean ratings of protection responsibility for self/family 
were significantly higher than all governmental influentials and they were most responsible of all 
stakeholders.  Employers were rated the highest for protection responsibility amongst the social 
influentials, and local government had the highest ratings amongst governmental influentials. 
Interrater agreement across all items was much lower than for knowledge and trustworthiness. It 
was highest for friends and self/ family responsibility. Mean ratings of protection responsibility 
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for self/family were significantly higher than knowledge ratings. Protection responsibility ratings 
for self/family were much higher than for all other stakeholders. The one noticeable difference 
between the two years was that, in 1997, mean ratings on trustworthiness for family were not 
significantly different from the newsmedia but in 1999 they were significantly higher than the 
newsmedia. 
 
4.3 Demographic Variables  
1997 Results 
There was no support at all for the Hypothesis 3a predictions that respondents’ ratings of 
self/family hazard knowledge would be significantly correlated with respondents’ demographic 
characteristics and their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. Of the 98 correlations (Table 
VII) between the 7 stakeholders’ hazard knowledge with 14 demographic variables, only 8 were 
statistically significant at 0.05 level. This small number of significant correlations does not 
exceed chance expectations (1% of 98 = 9) among these groups of variables. 
There was no support for the Hypothesis 3b predictions that respondent ratings of 
federal, state and local government and media trustworthiness would be significantly correlated 
with their demographic characteristics. There were statistically significant correlations between 
females and state government trustworthiness (r = 0.15) and, females and media trustworthiness 
(r = 0.14) and, mixed ethnicity and state trustworthiness (r = -0.14) only. Of the 98 correlations 
(Table VII), between the 7 stakeholders’ trustworthiness with 14 demographic variables, only 11 
were statistically significant at 0.05 level. The actual number of significant correlations (11) does 
not exceed chance expectations (1% of 98 = 9) among these groups of variables by a reasonable 
margin. 
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Variables Federal State Local Media Employer Friend Self/Fa
Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn
1. Age -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.13 -0.14 -0.08
2. Female 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.06
3. Hispanic 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.06
4. Asian -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.14 -0.06 -0.05
5. Black 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.05 -0.11
6. White 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.04
7. Other -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.02
8. Married -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.04
9. Widowed -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 0.10
10. Children 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05
11. Education -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13 0.07 0.01 0.00
12. Income -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 0.16 0.16 0.00
13. Renter 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.02 -0.01
14. Tenure -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.09
Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr
1. Age -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.14 -0.12 -0.16
2. Female 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.14 -0.03 0.06 -0.02
3. Hispanic 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.01
4. Asian -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.03
5. Black 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.02
6. White 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.04
7. Other -0.10 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01
8. Married 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.18 0.18
9. Widowed -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.09 0.02 -0.02
10. Children -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 0.09 0.11 0.17
11. Education -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.20 -0.12 -0.01 0.02
12. Income 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.15 0.10 0.14
13. Renter 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.04
14. Tenure 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.01
Re Re Re Re Re Re Re
1. Age -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10
2. Female 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.13
3. Hispanic 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.02
4. Asian 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.05
5. Black 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.16 -0.04 0.14 0.01
6. White -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 0.03 -0.20 0.06
7. Other -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.10
8. Married -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.19 0.00 -0.08 0.03
9. Widowed 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.04 0.10 0.03
10. Children 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.03 0.02
11. Education -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 -0.25 -0.09 -0.20 -0.02
12. Income -0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.21 0.05 -0.10 0.08
13. Renter 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.08 -0.05
14. Tenure -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.05
Kn = Hazard Knowledge, Tr = Trustworthiness, Re = Responsibility for Protection
Stakeholders' Protection 
Responsibility
Stakeholders' 
Trustworthiness
Table VII. Intercorrelations Between Demographic Characteristics and Stakeholder 
Characteristics for 1997 
Correlations between r = 0.13 to 0.17 are significant at the 0.05 level.
Notes: Correlations r = 0.18 or greater are significant at the 0.01 level 
Stakeholders' Hazard 
Knowledge
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There was very little support for the Hypothesis 3c predictions that respondents’ ratings 
of self/family protection responsibility were significantly correlated with their demographic 
characteristics. The only statistically significant correlation was between gender and self/family 
responsibility (r = 0.13). Of the 98 correlations (Table VII) between the 7 stakeholders’ 
responsibility for protection with 14 demographic variables, 30 were statistically significant at 
0.05 level. The actual number of significant correlations does exceed chance expectations (1% of 
98 = 9) among these groups of variables by a significant margin (21 more than expected by 
chance). 
 
1999 Results 
There was no support at all for the Hypothesis 3a predictions that respondents’ ratings of 
self/ family hazard knowledge would be significantly correlated with their demographic 
characteristics and their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. Of the 98 correlations (Table 
VIII) between the 7 stakeholders’ hazard knowledge with 14 demographic variables, only 6 were 
statistically significant at 0.05 level. The actual number of significant correlations (6) does not 
exceed chance expectations (1% of 98 = 9) among these groups of variables. 
There was no support for the Hypothesis 3b predictions that respondent ratings of 
federal, state and local government and media trustworthiness would be significantly correlated 
with their demographic characteristics. The only statistically significant correlations were 
between females and local government trustworthiness (r = 0.17), married respondents and 
federal government trustworthiness (r = -0.15), and widowed respondents and federal 
government (r = 0.14) and media (r = 0.15) trustworthiness only. Of the 98 correlations (Table 
VIII), between the 7 stakeholders’ trustworthiness with 14 demographic variables, only 11 were 
statistically significant at 0.05 level. The actual number of significant correlations (11) does not 
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exceed chance expectations (1% of 98 = 9) among these groups of variables by a significant 
margin. 
There was a little more support for Hypothesis 3c’s predictions that respondent ratings 
of self/ family protection responsibility would be significantly correlated with their demographic 
characteristics. There were statistically significant correlations between age of respondents’ (r = 
-0.17), married respondents’ (r = 0.13), income (r = 0.18), and community tenure (r = -0.13) 
with family responsibility. Of the 98 correlations (Table VIII) between the 7 stakeholders’ 
responsibility for protection with 14 demographic variables, 25 were statistically significant at 
0.05 level. The actual number of significant correlations does exceed chance expectations (1% of 
98 = 9) among these groups of variables by a significant margin (16 more than expected by 
chance). 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
 There were no significant correlations between respondents’ ratings of self/family 
hazard knowledge and trustworthiness with their demographic characteristics and their adoption 
of seismic hazard adjustments. However, there were significant correlations of demographic 
characteristics with protection responsibility in both years, but the number of statistically 
significant correlations was smaller in 1999 than in 1997. Moreover, the pattern of correlations 
was quite inconsistent. Only nine correlations were statistically significant in both years. None of 
the demographic variables was significantly associated with ratings of protection responsibility 
for more than two stakeholders. 
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Variables Federal State Local Media Employer Friend Self/Fa
Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn Kn
1. Age -0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.13 -0.05 -0.07
2. Female 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03
3. Hispanic -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.09
4. Asian 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12
5. Black 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.04
6. White -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.06
7. Other 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.19
8. Married -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03
9. Widowed -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.04
10. Children -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.14 0.03
11. Education -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.10 0.00 0.05
12. Income 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 0.10 0.00 -0.01
13. Renter -0.04 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01
14. Tenure -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.15 -0.06 0.05 -0.05
Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr Tr
1. Age -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.19 -0.14 -0.15
2. Female 0.04 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.04
3. Hispanic -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.01
4. Asian 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.06
5. Black 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.01
6. White -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08
7. Other 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.10 0.19
8. Married -0.15 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.13
9. Widowed 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.05 -0.07
10. Children -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.13
11. Education -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.08
12. Income 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.07 0.01 0.11
13. Renter 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.01
14. Tenure -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.07
Re Re Re Re Re Re Re
1. Age -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.24 -0.14 -0.03 -0.17
2. Female 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.03
3. Hispanic 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.06 -0.06 0.08 0.00
4. Asian 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.05
5. Black 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.08
6. White -0.18 -0.15 -0.13 -0.08 -0.07 -0.20 0.00
7. Other 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.11 -0.03
8. Married -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.14 0.01 0.13
9. Widowed 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.23 0.06 0.01 -0.12
10. Children 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.00 0.04
11. Education -0.13 -0.10 -0.06 -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 0.11
12. Income -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 0.07 -0.04 0.18
13. Renter 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.12 -0.05 0.12 -0.01
14. Tenure -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.13
Kn = Hazard Knowledge, Tr = Trustworthiness, Re = Responsibility for Protection
Notes: Correlations r = 0.18 or greater are significant at the 0.01 level 
Correlations between r = 0.13 to 0.17 are significant at the 0.05 level.
Table VIII. Intercorrelations Between Demographic Characteristics and Stakeholder 
Characteristics for 1999 
Stakeholders' Hazard 
Knowledge
Stakeholders' 
Trustworthiness
Stakeholders' Protection 
Responsibility
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4.4. Seismicity, Location, and Hazard Salience 
1997 Results 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 4, (Table IX) Californians gave higher ratings than 
Washingtonians, to many, but not all stakeholders’ hazard knowledge.  Table 4.4b shows there 
were no significant differences between the respondents of the two states with respect to federal 
government knowledge (t224 = 0.35, ns) and news media (t222 = 1.78, ns). However, there were 
significant differences for state (t225 = 3.98, p < .05) and local government (t222 = 4.37, p < .05), 
employers (t196 = 2.49, p < .05), friends (t221= 3.71, p< .05) and self/family (t223 = 2.40, p < .05) 
knowledge. 
There was less support for Hypothesis 4’s predictions on trustworthiness because there 
were no significant differences between the two states with respect to the federal government 
(t224= -0.35, ns), state government (t223 = 1.63, ns), news media (t222 = 1.19, ns) and employer 
(t197 = 1.65, ns) trustworthiness. However, differences in trustworthiness ratings for local 
government (t221= 3.24, p < .05), friends (t218 = 3.07, p < .05) and family (t219 = 2.77, p < .05) 
were significant, with California residents providing higher ratings than Washington residents.  
Support for Hypothesis 4 was weakest on ratings of protection responsibility, because 
there were no significant differences between California residents and Washington residents with 
respect to any of the ratings for federal government (t221 = 0.01, ns), state government (t223 = 
0.65, ns), local government (t222 = 1.38, ns), news media (t220 = -0.56, ns), employers (t196 = -
0.22, ns), friends (t220 = 1.46, ns) and self/family (t224 = 1.72, ns) on responsibility for seismic 
protection. 
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Partially consistent with Hypothesis 5 (Table IX), Californians reported higher levels 
than Washingtonians for hazard intrusiveness  (t230 = 3.04, p < .05), hazard experience (t220 = 
10.28, p < .05), and hazard adjustment adoption (t230 = 3.51, p < .05). Surprisingly, there were no 
Variables California Washington California Washington 
M (SD) M (SD) t-value M (SD) M (SD) t-value
Knowledge (Kn)
1. FedKn 3.50 (1.03) 3.45 (1.06) 0.35 3.51 (1.04) 3.47 (0.96) 0.25
2. StaKn 4.01 (0.91) 3.48 (1.02) 3.98*** 3.99 (1.02) 3.57 (0.93) 3.16***
3. LocKn 3.87 (1.00) 3.20 (1.18) 4.37*** 4.00 (1.07) 3.40 (1.06) 4.17***
4. MedKn 3.54 (1.09) 3.28 (1.07) 1.78 3.72 (1.25) 3.35 (1.07) 2.43**
5. EmpKn 3.48 (1.23) 3.04 (1.20) 2.49** 3.41 (1.22) 3.07 (1.13) 2.05**
6. FrdKn 3.24 (1.01) 2.76 (0.88) 3.71*** 3.38 (0.93) 2.76 (0.81) 5.24***
7. SelKn 3.69 (1.15) 3.33 (1.08) 2.4** 3.96 (0.90) 3.37 (0.93) 4.72***
8. FedTr 3.23 (1.16) 3.29 (1.12) -0.35 3.41 (1.12) 3.30 (1.04) 0.75
9. StaTr 3.72 (1.10) 3.47 (1.10) 1.63 3.92 (1.05) 3.52 (0.89) 3.03***
10. LocTr 3.82 (1.10) 3.34 (1.07) 3.24*** 3.93 (1.08) 3.45 (1.04) 3.32***
11. MedTr 3.63 (1.17) 3.44 (1.12) 1.19 3.68 (1.26) 3.56 (1.10) 0.76
12. EmpTr 3.39 (1.34) 3.08 (1.24) 1.65 3.38 (1.28) 2.97 (1.26) 2.23**
13. FrdTr 3.30 (1.16) 2.81 (1.15) 3.07*** 3.34 (1.10) 2.8 (1.14) 3.51***
14. SelTr 3.62 (1.26) 3.14 (1.27) 2.77** 3.56 (1.24) 3.11 (1.23) 2.67**
15. FedRe 3.02 (1.32) 3.02 (1.29) 0.01 3.22 (1.27) 2.68 (1.26) 3.11***
16. StaRe 3.35 (1.34) 3.24 (1.30) 0.65 3.55 (1.25) 3.01 (1.25) 3.12***
17. LocRe 3.51 (1.39) 3.25 (1.31) 1.38 3.53 (1.28) 3.12 (1.28) 2.36**
18. MedRe 2.63 (1.24) 2.73 (1.32) -0.56 2.83 (1.37) 2.62 (1.33) 1.12
19. EmpRe 2.88 (1.39) 2.93 (1.37) -0.22 3.13 (1.26) 2.72 (1.31) 2.14**
20. FrdRe 2.60 (1.23) 2.36 (1.11) 1.46 2.76 (1.28) 2.22 (1.08) 3.36***
21. SelRe 4.32 (1.05) 4.05 (1.22) 1.72* 4.28 (1.11) 4.10 (1.11) 1.19
Other
22.HazdInt 2.46 (0.79) 2.13 (0.82) 3.04*** 2.55 (0.97) 2.13 (0.79) 3.64***
23.HazdEx 1.82 (1.14) 0.49 (0.83) 10.28*** 1.76 (1.14) 0.48 (0.77) 10.24***
24.RiskPe 2.91 (0.81) 2.75 (0.89) 1.30 2.85 (0.93) 2.71 (0.80) 1.20
25.Gender 0.81 (3.87) 0.37 (0.48) 0.63 0.34 (0.48) 0.40 (0.55) -0.44
26.HazAdj 9.04 (3.23) 7.72 (2.51) 3.51*** 9.07 (3.00) 8.24 (2.50) 2.27**
Notes:  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Fed = Federal government, Sta = State government, Loc = Local government, Med = Media, 
Emp = Employer, Sel = Self/family, HazdInt = Hazard intrusiveness, HazdEx = Hazard experience, 
RiskPe = Risk perception, Gender = Female (1), HazAdj = Hazard Adjustment Adoption 
Trustworthiness (Tr)
Responsibility (Re)
Table IX. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD) and Significant Differences (t-value) Between Stakeholder 
Characteristics in Southern California (N = 91) and Western Washington (N = 141) for 1997 and 1999
1997 1999
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significant differences between the respondents of the two states with respect to risk perception 
(t227 = 1.30, ns).  
 
1999 Results 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 4 (Table IX), Californians gave consistently higher 
ratings than Washingtonians to the hazard knowledge of all stakeholders except federal 
government (t221 = 0.25, ns). There were significant differences for state (t223 = 3.16, p < .05) and 
local government (t223 = 4.17, p < .05), news media (t224 = 2.43, p < .05), employers (t196 = 2.05, 
p < .05), friends (t220= 5.24, p< .05), and self/family (t226 = 4.72, p < .05) knowledge.  
There was slightly less support for Hypothesis 4’s predictions on trustworthiness 
because there were no significant differences between the two states with respect to the federal 
government (t222 = 0.75, ns) and news media (t225 = 0.76, ns). However, differences in 
trustworthiness ratings for state government (t224= 3.03, p < .05), local government (t225= 3.32, p 
< .05), employer (t192= 2.14, p < .05), friends (t223 = 3.51, p < .05) and family (t225 = 2.67, p < 
.05) were significant, with California residents providing higher ratings than Washington 
residents.  
There was more support for Hypothesis 4’s predictions on responsibility by the 
governmental influentials because there were significant differences between the two states with 
respect to the federal government (t222 = 3.11, p < .05), state government (t225 = 3.12, p < .05) 
and local government (t222 = 2.36, p < .05), employers (t192 = 2.14, p < .05), and friends (t221 = 
3.36, p < .05) on responsibility for seismic protection. However, there were no significant 
differences between the two states with respect to the news media (t223 = 1.12, ns) and self/ 
family (t225 = 1.19, ns) responsibility for protection. 
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Partially consistent with Hypothesis 5 (Table IX), Californians reported higher levels 
than Washingtonians for hazard intrusiveness (t230 = 3.64, p < .05), hazard experience (t220 = 
10.24, p < .05), and hazard adjustment adoption (t230 = 2.27, p < .05). In this year also, there 
were no significant differences between the respondents of the two states with respect to risk 
perception (t230 = 1.20, ns).  
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
Federal government knowledge ratings did not differ for California and Washington 
respondents in either year whereas perceptions of state government, local government, employer, 
friends and self-knowledge ratings were significantly higher for Californian respondents.  In 
both years, only news media ratings had a mixed pattern of statistically significant differences. 
Perceptions of federal government and media trustworthiness were not significantly 
different for California and Washington respondents in either year. By contrast, perceptions of 
local government, friends, and family trustworthiness ratings were significantly higher for 
Californian respondents. In both years, state and employer trustworthiness ratings had mixed 
patterns with higher trust levels for Californians than Washingtonians in 1999 but not in 1997.  
New media and self/family ratings on responsibility for protection were not different for 
California and Washington respondents in either year but ratings for federal, state, local, 
employer, and friends had mixed patterns in 1997 and 1999. In both years, Californians had 
higher ratings of hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, and hazard adjustment adoption, but 
not risk perception. 
 
 
 
  
65 
 
 
4.5. Gender Differences in Risk Perceptions  
1997 Results 
Partially consistent with Hypothesis 6, Table V shows female respondents had higher 
risk perceptions (r = 0.19), and higher ratings on a few stakeholder characteristics. Female 
gender showed significant correlations with news media knowledge (r = 0.18), news media 
trustworthiness (r = 0.14), and state government trustworthiness (r = 0.15). Additionally, female 
gender had significantly higher correlations with all other stakeholders’ protection responsibility 
(average r = 0.18) than themselves (r = 0.13). Finally, although not hypothesized female gender 
showed significant correlations with personal control (r = -0.13), and resource adequacy (r = -
0.13). 
 
1999 Results 
There was very little consistency with Hypothesis 6, as Table VI shows female 
respondents had higher risk perceptions (r = 0.26), but showed higher ratings for only two 
stakeholder characteristics namely, local government trustworthiness (r = 0.17), and friend 
trustworthiness (r = 0.14) ratings only. Finally, although not hypothesized, female gender 
showed significant correlations with personal control (r = -0.18), and resource adequacy (r = -
0.15). 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
 In both years female respondents’ had significantly higher levels of risk perception than 
male respondents. However, the pattern of correlations of gender with stakeholder characteristics 
was not consistent from one year to the next. 
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4.6. Hazard Intrusiveness and Hazard Experience 
1997 Results 
Consistent with Hypothesis 7, Table V shows that respondents’ perceptions of 
stakeholder characteristics were positively correlated with their hazard intrusiveness, hazard 
experience and adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. Of the 21 correlations with hazard 
intrusiveness, 11 were statistically significant at 0.05 level. Of the 21 correlations with hazard 
experience, 9 were statistically significant at 0.05 level. In both cases, only one would be 
expected by chance. Consistent patterns were observed between hazard intrusiveness and hazard 
experience ratings with some stakeholder characteristics. There were statistically significant 
correlations of local government knowledge with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.20) and hazard 
experience (r = 0.17); of employer knowledge with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.18) and hazard 
experience (r = 0.16); of friend knowledge with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.14) and hazard 
experience (r = 0.17); and of self/family knowledge with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.27) and 
hazard experience (r = 0.25). Respondents’ reports of their adoption of seismic hazard 
adjustments were positively correlated with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.39) and hazard 
experience (r = 0.41). 
 
1999 Results 
Consistent with Hypothesis 7, Table VI shows that respondents’ perceptions of 
stakeholder characteristics were positively correlated with their hazard intrusiveness, hazard 
experience, and adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. Of the 21 correlations with hazard 
intrusiveness, 6 were statistically significant at 0.05 level. Of the 21 correlations with hazard 
experience, 13 were statistically significant at 0.05 level.  Both exceed the chance expectation of 
one significant correlation. Consistent patterns were observed between hazard intrusiveness and 
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hazard experience ratings with some stakeholder characteristics. There were statistically 
significant correlations of self/family knowledge with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.17) and hazard 
experience (r = 0.37); of local government trustworthiness with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.16) 
and hazard experience (r = 0.14); of employer trustworthiness with hazard intrusiveness (r = 
0.14) and hazard experience (r = 0.17); of friend trustworthiness with hazard intrusiveness (r = 
0.17) and hazard experience (r = 0.17); of self/family trustworthiness with hazard intrusiveness 
(r = 0.18) and hazard experience (r = 0.24). Respondents’ reports of their adoption of seismic 
hazard adjustments were positively correlated with hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.26) and hazard 
experience (r = 0.41). 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
Although the number of significant correlations of stakeholder characteristics exceeded 
chance in both years, only the correlation of self/ family knowledge with hazard intrusiveness 
and hazard experience was significant in both years. In addition, hazard intrusiveness and hazard 
experience had significantly high positive correlations in both years with the adoption of seismic 
hazard adjustments.  
 
4.7. Stakeholder Characteristics with Risk Perceptions  
1997 Results 
Consistent with Hypothesis 8, Table V shows respondents’ risk perceptions were 
positively correlated with their perceptions of stakeholder characteristics but not with their 
adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. Of the 21 correlations with risk perception, 14 were 
statistically significant at 0.05 level (only one would be expected by chance). There were 
statistically significant positive correlations between risk perception and six of the stakeholders’ 
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knowledge ratings: state government knowledge (r = 0.15), local knowledge (r = 0.21), news 
media knowledge (r = 0.14), employer knowledge (r = 0.24), friend knowledge (r = 0.16), and 
self/family knowledge (r = 0.26). However, risk perception was positively correlated with only 
two stakeholders’ trustworthiness ratings: employer trustworthiness (r = 0.13) and family 
trustworthiness (r = 0.13). But risk perception was positively correlated with all governmental 
and social influentials protection responsibility (average r = 0.18) except self/family. As 
hypothesized, risk perception did not show any positive correlations with seismic hazard 
adjustment adoption.  
Of the 21 correlations with hazard adjustment adoption, 10 were statistically significant 
at 0.05 level (only one would be expected by chance). Of these, a common pattern emerged that 
there were statistically significant correlations between seismic hazard adjustment adoption and 
peer group (employer, friend, and self/family) knowledge (average r = 0.31), peer group 
trustworthiness (average r = 0.31), peer group responsibility (average r = 0.18), and local 
government knowledge (r = 0.14) ratings.  
 
1999 Results 
Consistent with Hypothesis 8, Table VI shows respondents’ risk perceptions were 
positively correlated with their perceptions of stakeholder characteristics but not with their 
adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. Of the 21 correlations between stakeholder 
characteristics and risk perceptions, 12 were statistically significant at 0.05 level. There were 
statistically significant correlations between risk perception with governmental knowledge 
(average r = 0.22), news media knowledge (r = 0.29), and self/family knowledge (average r = 
0.21).  Risk perception was significantly correlated with only two stakeholders’ trustworthiness 
ratings: local government trustworthiness (r = 0.13) and family trustworthiness (r = 0.13). 
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However, risk perception was significantly correlated with all stakeholders’ protection 
responsibility (average r = 0.17) except employer and friend responsibility. Risk perception did 
not show any significant correlations with seismic hazard adjustment adoption.  
Of the 21 correlations with hazard adjustments, 7 were statistically significant at 0.05 
level. There were statistically significant correlations between seismic hazard adjustment 
adoptions and peer group (employer, friend, self/family) knowledge (average r = 0.28), local 
government knowledge (r = 0.13), employer trustworthiness (r = 0.20), self/family 
trustworthiness (r = 0.21), self/family responsibility (r = 0.23) ratings. 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
The number of significant positive correlations of stakeholder characteristics with risk 
perceptions exceeded chance in both years. Risk perception was consistently correlated with 
state government, news media, and self/family knowledge; family trustworthiness; federal, state, 
and local government, news media, and employer responsibility. Similarly, the number of 
significant positive correlations of stakeholder characteristics with the adoption of seismic 
hazard adjustments exceeded chance in both years. Adjustment adoption was consistently 
correlated with peer group (employer, friend, and self/family) and local government knowledge; 
employer and family trustworthiness; and self/family responsibility.  However, risk perception 
did not show any significant correlations with seismic hazard adjustment adoption in either year. 
 
4.8. Fatalism, Personal Control, and Resource Adequacy 
1997 & 1999 Results 
Table X shows there was no support for the Hypothesis 9a predictions that respondents’ 
fatalism (luck or chance/God’s will) will be significantly correlated with their risk perceptions 
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and with their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. The only significant correlation was 
between respondents’ belief in luck/ chance and act of God in 1997 (r = 0.26) and 1999 (r = 
0.24) respectively, but none with seismic hazard adjustment adoption. 
Table X shows there was no support for the Hypothesis 9b predictions that respondents’ 
perceptions of personal control (whose actions govern their personal safety in an earthquake) 
will be positively correlated with their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. There were 
statistically significant negative correlations between personal control and risk perception in 
1997 (r = -0.16) and 1999 (r = -0.17), respectively, but none with seismic hazard adjustment 
adoption. 
Consistent with the Hypothesis 9c, Table X shows respondents’ perceptions of 
implementation barriers such as lack of required information and skills or other resources such as 
tools and equipment and financial assets (i.e. perceived resource adequacy) was negatively 
correlated with their adoption of seismic hazard adjustments in 1997 (r = 0.52) and in 1999 (r = 
0.54) respectively. 
 
Comparison of Results in 1997 and 1999 
 In both years, there were statistically significant positive correlations between 
respondents’ perceptions of the hazard being an act of God with it being an act of luck/chance 
and consistently nonsignificant correlations of these variables with hazard adjustment adoption. 
Perceived personal control had significant negative correlations with risk perceptions and 
consistently nonsignificant correlations with hazard adjustment adoption. There were statistically 
significant positive correlations between respondents’ perceptions of resource adequacy with 
hazard adjustment adoption. 
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4.9. City Activity in Hazard Management 
1997 & 1999 Results 
There was no support for the Hypothesis 10a predictions that households in leader 
communities in both regions will have greater levels of hazard intrusiveness, perceptions of 
seismic hazards, and hazard adjustment adoptions than those in laggard communities. There 
were no significant correlations observed. 
There was no support for the Hypothesis 10b predictions that ratings of stakeholder 
knowledge, trustworthiness, and responsibility for protection, will be significantly higher for 
respondents in leader communities than for those in laggard communities in both regions. There 
were no significant correlations observed. 
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. PerCo 16.3 4.23 1.00
2. ResAd 8.98 3.02 0.16* 1.00
3. ActLu 2.79 1.41 0.06 -0.05 1.00
4. ActGod 2.75 1.67 0.06 -0.04 0.26** 1.00
5. RiskPe 2.81 0.86 -0.16** -0.02 0.12 -0.01 1.00
6. HazAdj 8.24 2.88 0.03 0.52** 0.07 0.00 0.10 1.00
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. PerCo 17.09 4.13 1.00
2. ResAd 9.32 3.22 0.00 1.00
3. ActLu 3.02 1.6 0.14* -0.01 1.00
4. ActGod 2.79 1.74 0.23** 0.11 0.24** 1.00
5. RiskPe 2.76 0.85 -0.17** -0.16* 0.03 -0.12 1.00
6. HazAdj 8.56 2.73 -0.01 0.54** 0.02 0.05 0.12 1.00
Table X. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD) and Intercorrelations Between Personal Control,  Resource 
Adequacy, Fatalism and Risk Perception with Hazard Adjustment Adoption 
Notes: *Correlations between r = 0.14 to 0.16 are significant at the 0.05 level,                                     
**Correlations r = 0.17 or greater are significant at the 0.01 level.                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. PerCo = Personal Control, 2. ResAd = Resource Adequacy, 3. ActLu = Act of luck, 4. ActGod = Act God, 5. 
RiskPe = Risk Perception, 6. HazAdj = Hazard Adjustment Adoption 
1997
1999
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4.10. Stability of Perceptions from 1997 to 1999 
The similarity in the pattern of correlations within 1997 and 1999 (see Tables V 
& VI) suggests there will be an approximately linear plot if these correlations are 
analyzed in the same way as they were for Fig. 5. This is indeed the case as indicated by 
Fig.7 . 
 
Fig. 7. Cross-plot of interitem correlations for respondents in Time 1 (1997) and Time 2 (1999). 
 
On examination of the stability correlations, which are the correlations between the 
measures of each variable at Time 1 and Time 2, it is observed that the minimum stability 
correlation is .23 and the maximum is .73 (see Appendix A). All of these correlations are 
statistically significant. The absolute value of stability correlations for knowledge fell in the 
range of .00≤ r ≤.49 and the resulting average correlation was r =. 37. For trustworthiness, the 
stability correlations fell in the range of .00≤ r ≤.53 and the resulting average correlation was r. = 
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.45. For responsibility, the stability correlations fell in the range of .00≤ r ≤.50 and the resulting 
average correlation was r = 0.41. However, stability correlations for federal knowledge (r = 
0.23), state government knowledge (r = 0.24), friend responsibility (r = 0.26), and self/family 
responsibility (r = 0.31) were relatively low.  
There were only three statistically significant differences in means between Time 1 and 
Time 2 (Table XI). Firstly, respondents’ perceptions of local government knowledge (t217 = -
2.19, p < .05) ratings were higher in 1999 than in 1997. In addition, respondents’ perceptions of 
federal government responsibility (t217 = 5.17, p < .05) ratings were lower in 1999 than in 1997. 
Finally, respondents’ adoption of seismic hazard adjustments (t231 = -2.40, p < .05) was higher in 
1999 than in 1997.  
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Stakeholder Characteristics 
Pairs M SD t-value
Knowledge (Kn)
1. 97FedKn - 99FedKn -0.05 1.26 -0.54
2. 97StaKn - 99StaKn -0.06 1.23 -0.77
3. 97LocKn - 99LocKn -0.17 1.17 -2.19**
4. 97MedKn - 99MedKn -0.11 1.23 -1.26
5. 97EmpKn - 99EmpKn -0.01 1.33 -0.06
6. 97FrdKn - 99FrdKn -0.05 1.02 -0.74
7. 97SelKn - 99SelKn -0.14 1.07 -1.95
Trustworthiness (Tr)
8. FedTr97 - FedTr99 -0.09 1.15 -1.12
9. StaTr97 - StaTr99 -0.11 1.00 -1.67
10. LocTr97 - LocTr99 -0.11 1.13 -1.49
11. MedTr97 - MedTr99 -0.12 1.25 -1.40
12. EmpTr97 - EmpTr99 0.07 1.30 0.68
13. FrdTr97 - FrdTr99 -0.01 1.28 -0.16
14. SelTr97 - SelTr99 0.01 1.31 0.16
Responsibility (Re)
15. FedRe97 - FedRe99 0.56 1.60 5.17***
16. StaRe97 - StaRe99 0.05 1.29 0.63
17. LocRe97 - LocRe99 0.08 1.33 0.92
18. MedRe97 - MedRe99 0.03 1.35 0.35
19. EmpRe97 - EmpRe99 0.00 1.47 0.00
20. FrdRe97 - FrdRe99 0.03 1.43 0.33
21. SelRe97 - SelRe99 -0.03 1.35 -0.35
Other variables
22. HazInt97 - HazInt99 -0.04 0.97 -0.56
23. HazEx97 - HazEx99 0.03 0.77 0.68
24. RisPe97 - RisPe99 0.05 0.82 0.88
25. Gender97 - Gender99 0.02 0.33 1.00
26. HazAd97 - HazAd99 -0.33 2.08 -2.4**
HazAdj = Hazard Adjustment Adoption 
TableXI. Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD), t-value Gauging the 
Stability of Perceptions from Time1 to Time 2 
Paired Differences
Notes:  *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Fed = Federal government, Sta = State government
Loc = Local government, Med = Media, Emp = Employer,
Sel = Self/family, HazIn = Hazard Intrusiveness,
HazdEx = Hazard Experience, RiskPe = Risk Perception, 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Discussion 
The results of this study generally supported most, but not all, of the ten hypotheses. It 
extends the results of previous studies, especially those of Lindell and Whitney (2000), to a 
larger more diverse sample of respondents’ at two different time frames in two different seismic 
regions. The cross plot of inter-item correlations for select variables (stakeholder knowledge, 
trustworthiness, and responsibility, controllability, resource adequacy, hazard intrusiveness, 
hazard experience, risk perception, gender, and hazard adjustment adoption) for California and 
Washington residents was approximately linear. This indicated that respondents in these two 
seismic regions were equivalent in their perceptions and hence respondents from both these 
regions were combined and treated as one dataset. The actual number of significant correlations 
—190 in 1997 (Table V) and 183 in 1999 (Table VI) — substantially exceeds chance 
expectations and is an indicator that there is indeed stability of perceptions from Time 1 to Time 
2. This finding indicates that, in general, the ratings of the questionnaire items are stable 
overtime and reflect real beliefs rather than pseudo-attitudes. This is important for the study of 
households’ seismic hazard adjustments because pseudo-attitudes cannot motivate adoption of 
protective actions. By contrast, real beliefs that reflect the salience of an issue in the minds of 
people can motivate personal action and help to guide community actions, especially political 
legislative ideas. 
Data relevant to Hypothesis 1a revealed significant correlations (1997 average r = 0.62; 
1999 average r = 0.57) of respondents’ perceptions of stakeholders’ hazard knowledge with the 
corresponding ratings of trustworthiness, whereas data relevant to Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 
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1c indicated protection responsibility had much lower correlations with hazard knowledge (1997 
average r = 0.30; 1999 average r = 0.28) and trustworthiness (1997 average r = 0.34; 1999 
average r = 0.33) than the latter had with each other. The differences in these correlations 
suggest knowledge and trustworthiness are perceived as being roughly equivalent because 
ratings of hazard knowledge and trustworthiness are quite similar in means and are highly 
correlated. Thus, it is difficult to determine if seismic hazard knowledge is inferred from 
trustworthiness, trustworthiness is inferred from seismic hazard knowledge, or both are inferred 
from some other source characteristic(s). However, protection responsibility is perceived as a 
distinctly different characteristic—at least for some stakeholders. As noted earlier, hazard 
knowledge and trustworthiness seem to imply protection responsibility must be assumed to a 
greater extent by local government than by employers and more by employers than by the news 
media and friends. Conversely, self and family have protection responsibility even when hazard 
knowledge and trustworthiness are low. The complexity of these findings indicates further 
research, possibly in different cultural settings of the world, is needed to replicate and explain 
them.  
The profiles of mean ratings for both years were similar. Hazard knowledge ratings were 
highest for the state government and lowest for employer and friends. This partial support for 
Hypothesis 2a is important because it confirms government agencies are likely to be considered 
to be more credible information sources than peers (friends and employer). The higher level of 
governmental hazard knowledge is most likely to affect households when government claims 
about hazards conflict with those of peers, particularly when such peers attempt to pass on 
erroneous information about seismic hazard (Whitney, et al., 2004). However, lack of stability in 
whether government agencies are more knowledgeable than or only as knowledgeable as 
self/family is important because there is a need to understand whether households will accept 
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initiatives from these agencies without question if the agencies’ claims strongly conflict with 
their own beliefs. The limitation of the present finding is that it refers to both government 
agencies in general and peers in general. It is unclear how a specific government agency (e.g., an 
emergency management agency vs. a police department) or a specific representative of an 
agency would compare to a specific peer considered to be knowledgeable about seismic hazard.  
In addition, though not hypothesized, the present study found the news media were 
considered to be as knowledgeable as the government agencies and employers were judged little 
more knowledgeable than friends. Overall, the level of differentiation among the levels of 
government with respect to hazard knowledge found in this study was less than that reported by 
Lindell and Whitney (2000). Indeed, the level of differentiation in hazard knowledge among all 
stakeholders was smaller—2.9-3.7 (1997) and 3.00-3.70 (1999) in this study versus 2.7-4.0 in 
Lindell and Whitney. This lower level of differentiation among stakeholders with respect to 
ratings of hazard knowledge is noteworthy because the profile for this stakeholder characteristic 
is virtually identical to that reported by Lindell and Perry (1992) for volcano hazard. Moreover, 
the latter data showed ratings of stakeholder knowledge of volcano hazards were quite different 
from those for chemical and radiological hazards (which were similar to each other).  
The similarity of the hazard knowledge profiles for earthquake (Lindell & Whitney, 
2000 and the present study) and volcano (Lindell & Perry, 1992) hazards versus the 
corresponding profiles for radiological and chemical hazards (Lindell & Perry, 1992) suggests 
profiles of stakeholder knowledge for (more familiar) natural hazards will be similar to each 
other and different from profiles of stakeholder knowledge for (less familiar) technological 
hazards. Future research should use a variety of other hazards to determine if this conjecture is 
correct. Such research should consider the findings of Slovic and his colleagues (1987, 1992) 
regarding the degree to which hazards are known to science and to those exposed. In the context 
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of the present research, hazard knowledge by the federal government is a reasonable proxy for 
risks known to science, whereas hazard knowledge by self/family is equivalent to risks known to 
those exposed. From this perspective, the present research extends Slovic’s work in examining 
the level of knowledge by important societal stakeholders intermediate in knowledge between 
scientists and those exposed. It also extends Slovic’s work by examining stakeholders’ relative 
levels of trustworthiness and protection responsibility, neither of which dimensions is addressed 
within the framework described by Slovic (1987, 1992). These data on hazard knowledge 
support Lindell and Whitney’s (2000) conclusion that research on optimistic bias is more 
informative if it includes a variety of stakeholders. This study also suggests optimistic bias is 
limited to peers and supports Rothman, Klein and Weinstein’s (1996) conclusion that optimistic 
bias results from underestimating (some) others’ abilities rather than overestimating one’s own.  
The partial support for Hypothesis 2b is consistent with the partial support for 
Hypothesis 2a in suggesting government sources are considered to be more trustworthy, as well 
as more knowledgeable, than peers. It was surprising to find the family (recall that the family 
only, not self and family, was rated with respect to trustworthiness) was considered to be no 
more trustworthy than the federal government and less trustworthy than the state and local 
government. Trust in news media was also higher than employer, friends and family. Given the 
findings of public opinion polls revealing a pervasive lack of trust in institutions (Slovic, 1997) 
this needs to be pursued in future research.  
The finding that mean ratings of protection responsibility were highest for self/family, 
next highest for government, and lowest for peers confirms Hypothesis 2c. This is a theoretically 
significant result because it suggests people are taking more responsibility for seismic safety 
than was found in earlier studies (e.g., Jackson, 1977, 1981). This evidence of a major shift in 
public thinking over the past 30 years means that official statements that earthquake victims 
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must be prepared to survive without help for at least 72 hours, are being heeded by the risk area 
population (Lindell & Whitney, 2000).  Interestingly, the nonsignificant differences between 
California and Washington residents suggest this assumption of personal responsibility results 
from something broader than messages from local seismic safety officials, which would 
presumably have been limited to the California sample before Washington’s 2001 Nisqually 
earthquake. The source(s) of this pervasive increase in personal responsibility should be 
addressed in future research. 
 In addition, though not hypothesized, the present study found news media and 
employers were considered to be slightly less responsible than governmental agencies and 
slightly more responsible than friends. This is important because, even though governmental 
agencies continue to be thought of as most responsible, they can widen their influence through 
concentrated efforts in conjunction with the news media, as well as with service organizations, 
trade unions, industry groups, educational institutions, and neighborhood organizations that 
essentially form the employers’ pool.  As was the case with hazard knowledge, the level of 
differentiation among the government agencies found with respect to protection responsibility in 
this study was less than that reported by Lindell and Whitney (2000). Indeed, the level of 
differentiation in protection responsibility among all stakeholders was smaller, ranging 2.5–4.1 
in this study versus 2.2–4.4 in Lindell and Whitney (2000). Thus, the heuristics a respondent 
uses to judge protection responsibility seem to be different from the ones they use to judge 
hazard knowledge and trustworthiness. This is especially clear for perceptions of federal 
responsibility because the r*wg values for this variable were lower than for any others and Table 
V & VI indicates this was due primarily to the ratings of Washington residents. However, it is 
unclear why there would be a difference on only this variable. 
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The confirmation of Hypothesis 2d (mean ratings of protection responsibility were lower 
than ratings of hazard knowledge and trustworthiness for all stakeholders except self/family, 
which had higher ratings for protection responsibility than for hazard knowledge) is important 
because knowledge and trust seem to form an upper bound for protection responsibility by 
stakeholders other than self/family. In this regard, government and employers are seen as having 
a role relationship that is different from that of news media and friends. This difference raises 
questions about perceived role expectations of other stakeholders in other hazards, especially the 
role expectations of facility operators in connection with radiological or toxic chemical hazards. 
Data relevant to Hypothesis 3a did not find any support, as there were no meaningful 
correlations between hazard knowledge of the seven stakeholders and the 14 demographic 
variables. The few that were reported were not consistent over both years. Hence, as the results 
are not replicated using the same respondents, they probably are chance fluctuations in the data. 
Data relevant to Hypothesis 3b found very little support in that females’ perception of trust was 
positively correlated with the state government and newsmedia in 1997 but not in 1999. This 
might be because the number of female household respondents’ declined in 1999 (the household 
member answering the questionnaire for the second wave in 1999 was not necessarily the same 
as who answered it in 1997). 
The finding that demographic characteristics were not good predictors of seismic hazard 
adjustment adoption in this study is consistent with Lindell & Perry’s (2000) review of the 
literature. In one sense, this is a helpful finding because demographic variables like ethnicity, 
income, community tenure, homeownership, etc. are not instrumental variables that emergency 
managers can change. Although demographic variables were not good predictors in both years, 
future researchers should not ignore them because it is important to assess the degree to which 
study samples are demographically representative of the populations from which they are drawn. 
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Data relevant to Hypothesis 4 revealed partial support by finding perceptions of some 
stakeholder characteristics were significantly higher for respondents in higher seismic risk area 
(Southern California) than those in a moderate seismic risk area (Western Washington). Mean 
ratings on hazard knowledge found respondents from California and Washington rated the 
federal government’s knowledge equally but Californians generally rated the other six 
stakeholders’ (state, local, news media, employer, peers, self/family) knowledge higher than 
Washingtonians did. This corresponds with our expectations that Californians have interpreted 
the numerous earthquakes and advisories as increasing their hazard knowledge. Mean ratings on 
trustworthiness found respondents from both the states rated the federal government and news 
media equally. By contrast, perceptions of local government, friends, and family trustworthiness 
ratings were significantly higher for Californian respondents. Differences in mean ratings on 
protection responsibility were not stable over time, as Californians gave governmental 
influentials, employer, and friends higher ratings in 1999 but not in 1997. Only news media and 
self-responsibility ratings were stable for both regions. The differences in the findings across 
stakeholder characteristics raise questions about why they occurred. The pattern of differences 
with respect to hazard knowledge can be interpreted as indicating California residents were more 
confident than Washington residents (and reasonably so) that all stakeholders within their state 
were relatively knowledgeable about seismic hazard. However, it is unclear why both years’ data 
indicated Californians have more confidence in the trustworthiness of local government, friends, 
and family than do Washingtonians. It might be that decades of earthquake advisories, confirmed 
by numerous earthquakes, have created a generalized sense of confidence in the trustworthiness 
of some sources of seismic hazard information. It is similarly unclear why Californians consider 
all government agencies and employers and friends as more responsible for their safety only in 
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1999. An explanation of these findings is most likely to emerge from further research that 
includes other environmental hazards, such as toxic chemicals release.  
There was partial support for Hypothesis 5 in 1997 & 1999 – which posited respondents 
from a higher seismic risk area (California) would have greater hazard intrusiveness, hazard 
experience, and risk perception than respondents in a moderate seismic risk area (Washington). 
Although, Californians did show significantly higher hazard intrusiveness and hazard experience 
ratings, these did not produce heightened risk perceptions. There were no significant differences 
between respondents in the two states with respect to their risk perceptions. This supports the 
notion that having seismic hazard experience and increased hazard intrusiveness alone are not 
the deciding variables for increased risk perceptions. There must be other antecedent variables 
that increase risk perceptions, but none of them were identified in this study.   
The weak support for Hypothesis 6—which posited female respondents would have 
higher stakeholders’ hazard knowledge, trustworthiness, and protection responsibility as well as 
perceptions of seismic risk—is interesting because, although females showed higher risk 
perceptions in both years than male respondents, they did not show consistently high ratings on 
all stakeholder characteristics. The 1997 data showed females actually had greater confidence in 
the news media than in authorities and also were more likely to believe stakeholders other than 
self/family were responsible for their safety. The reason for this broader assignment of protection 
responsibility should be pursued in future research because it might be related to gender effects 
in the broader political arena.  For example, women tend to be more supportive than men for 
government initiatives for family programs (Atkeson & Rapaport, 2003; Shapiro & Mahajan, 
1986). Thus the explanation might be that they are more supportive than men of collective 
(rather than individualistic) actions. Alternatively, women may perceive a greater need for 
protection in general, or their lower level of adoption of hazard adjustments may be related to 
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(lack of) control over enough financial resources to achieve protection from seismic hazard 
(Lindell & Prater, 2000). Although not hypothesized, both years’ results showed that female 
gender had significant negative correlations with perceived personal control (personal safety in 
an earthquake being determined by the actions of themselves/family, friends, relatives, neighbors 
and coworkers, local news media, local government and federal, and state agencies) and resource 
adequacy (having all the information, tools and equipment, and financial assets: money, credit, 
and insurance, needed to protect themselves against the earthquake). Thus, future research 
should more carefully examine gender differences in perceptions of individual hazard 
adjustments. This could reveal if, for example, gender differences are limited to the most 
expensive hazard adjustments, those requiring special tools and equipment, or other gender-
relevant hazard adjustment attributes. Additionally, it could inform us whether these differences 
arise due to a gender-blind analysis in which women’s perspectives are marginalized in the 
dominant institutional practices. Women often manage the household budget and, if they are not 
privy to important information, they cannot budget expenses differently to prepare for the event. 
Consequently, they may continue to spend money without regard to future situations. There are 
also problems that arise from male-dominated information networks. There is an increasing need 
to encourage women’s participation in community outreach programs both as community 
educators and receivers. By making them responsible for developing public education and 
awareness programs, we can increase the likelihood the needs and roles of women will be taken 
into consideration. It might be worthwhile for future research on long-range sustainable risk 
reduction programs to be more quantitative, using gender equality indicators to disaggregate data 
and findings that allow us to target female population segments and inform them better.  
Data relevant to Hypothesis 7 revealed partial support by finding a number of significant 
correlations of stakeholder characteristics with hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, and 
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hazard adjustment adoption that exceeded chance in both years. The correlation of self/family 
knowledge with hazard intrusiveness and hazard experience was significant in both years. In 
addition, both years’ data showed hazard intrusiveness and hazard experience had significantly 
high positive correlations with the adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. These findings are 
consistent with Lindell & Whitney’s (2000) study, suggesting that increasing people’s 
experience with a hazard will in turn encourage them to think, speak and receive information, 
about the hazard, thus increasing hazard adjustment adoption. However, further analyses are 
needed to assess the direction of causality among these variables. 
Hypothesis 8 revealed partial support by finding a number of significant correlations of 
stakeholder characteristics with risk perception that exceeded chance in both years. Risk 
perception was consistently correlated with state government, news media, and self/family 
knowledge; family trustworthiness; federal, state, and local government, news media, and 
employer responsibility. It was surprising that trustworthiness ratings for stakeholders other than 
family did not affect risk perception. This conflicts with the findings for the 1997 sample as a 
whole (N=532) and could be the result of a small biased panel sample data set.  In recent years, 
numerous articles and surveys have shown the negative effects of extreme distrust in individuals, 
industries, and institutions responsible for risk management and linked it to risk perception 
(Slovic, 2000). Studies have further shown that initial trust influences interpretations of events, 
thus reinforcing people’s prior beliefs. An explanation of these differences is most likely to 
emerge from further research. In any event, Hypothesis 8 was supported by the nonsignificant 
correlation of risk perception with hazard adjustment adoption. This suggests stakeholder 
characteristics affect hazard adjustment via the peripheral route rather than the central route 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Weinstein and Nicolich (1993) have demonstrated that correlations 
between risk perception and hazard adjustment adoption could be spuriously low when tested 
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with cross-sectional data. However, this longitudinal panel study suggests similar findings 
indicating that risk perceptions alone do not predict household hazard adjustments adoption. 
There was no support in either year for Hypotheses 9a & 9b. There were no significant 
correlations between respondents’ perception of the hazard being an act of God, or an act of 
luck/chance with hazard adjustment adoption; or between perceived personal control and hazard 
adjustment adoption, respectively.  This coincides with Farley et al.’s (1993) fatalism studies, 
which showed inconsistent correlations with hazard adjustments. This is a contradictory to 
previous research that suggests receiver characteristics governed by cognitive and attitudinal 
processes are particularly important in increasing hazard awareness, thereby increasing hazard 
adjustment adoption (Mulilis & Duval, 1995). Future research needs to look into the reasons for 
these differences. 
Data relevant to Hypothesis 9c found support in that respondents’ perception of 
perceived resource adequacy was positively correlated with hazard adjustment adoption. This 
correlation confirms the theorizing of previous researchers (Mulilis et al., 1990; Mulilis & 
Duval, 1995; Lindell & Perry, 2004) that perceived presence of implementation barriers—such 
as lack of required information and skill, tools and equipment, and financial assets—predicts 
adoption of seismic hazard adjustments. 
Data relevant to Hypothesis 10 found no support because households in leader 
communities in both regions did not show greater levels of stakeholder knowledge, 
trustworthiness, and responsibility for protection, hazard intrusiveness, risk perception, and 
hazard adjustment adoption than those in laggard communities. Hence, these findings did not 
support previous research, which showed that City activity in earthquake hazard management 
was an important correlate to seismic hazard adjustments (May & Birkland, 1994). This shows 
that the commitment of communities to deal with earthquake risks, local governmental capacity 
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for addressing earthquake risks, and the hazard context that establishes the tractability of 
addressing earthquake risks, the three sets of factors based on which May and Birkland (1994) 
classified the cities, did not influence the households’ perceptions of hazard adjustments as 
expected. There seems to be a gap between local government initiatives and communication with 
the citizenry that needs to be examined in future research.  
 
5.2 Stability of Perceptions over Time 
The similarity in the pattern of correlations within 1997 and 1999 translated into an 
approximately linear plot of interitem correlations as seen in Figure 7. The correlations between 
the measures of each variable at Time 1 and Time 2 reveals consistent stabilities, with a 
minimum stability correlation of .23 and a maximum of .73 (see appendix). Stability correlations 
for federal knowledge (r = 0.23), state government knowledge (r = 0.24), friend responsibility (r 
= 0.26), and self/family responsibility (r = 0.31) were relatively the lowest and these inconsistent 
patterns of low correlations needs to be looked into. 
There were only three statistically significant differences in means between Time 1 and 
Time 2 as seen in Table XI. Respondents’ perceptions of local government knowledge (t217 = -
2.19, p < .05) ratings were higher in 1999 than in 1997. This difference could be due to special 
earthquake management efforts carried out in a particular city or in a particular seismic region. 
Research looking into these differences will inform us of possible best practices in those areas 
which can be translated to others.  
In addition, respondents’ perceptions of federal government responsibility (t217 = 5.17, p 
< .05) ratings were lower in 1999 than in 1997. This finding is theoretically significant because it 
supports the argument that people’s perceptions of governmental protection responsibility have 
been declining since Jackson’s (1977, 1981) and Garcia’s (1989) research. Significantly, only 
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perceptions of federal protection responsibility changed, while perceptions of state or local 
government responsibility remained the same. Further research is needed to replicate this finding 
and explain why it occurred. Finally, respondents’ adoption of seismic hazard adjustments (t231 = 
-2.40, p < .05) was higher in 1999 than in 1997. This could have been because of improved city 
activity or management initiatives that increased hazard knowledge. Alternatively the increase 
could have resulted from being part of the respondent pool, which might have heightened their 
hazard intrusiveness and thereby increased adoption of hazard adjustments.  
The variables predicting hazard adjustment over time seemed to follow a very interesting 
pattern. Despite many significant stability correlations between Time 1 and Time 2, the ones that 
seem to really matter in protective action decision-making were: employer knowledge, friend 
knowledge, and self/family knowledge (peer group knowledge average r = 0.31); employer 
trustworthiness, friend trustworthiness, and family trustworthiness (peer group trustworthiness 
average r = 0.31); self/family responsibility (r = 0.21); hazard intrusiveness (r = 0.36); hazard 
experience (r = 0.35) and location Washington (r = -0.15). Female gender, risk perception and 
other stakeholder characteristics did not predict hazard adjustment adoption over time.  
These are very interesting findings that suggest stakeholder characteristics could affect 
hazard adjustment adoption in one of two ways, indirect or direct. In this case, an indirect effect 
on hazard adjustment might have occurred through the respondent’s perception of peer group 
knowledge and trustworthiness, which influence him/her to accept information about a hazard 
and hazard adjustments and this information, in turn, changes their behavioral intentions and 
actual behavior. This indirect effect corresponds to changes in Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) 
attitude toward the act, Petty & Cacioppo’s, (1986) central route to persuasion, and Chaiken’s 
(1987) systematic processing. An alternative direct effect is also possible as employers, friends, 
and family are very close to oneself as seen in the ‘onion model’ and thereby influence a 
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person’s behavioral intentions and actual behavior without affecting their acceptance of 
information about the hazard and hazard adjustment. Clearly, increased trust between peer group 
and oneself leads to positive interactions (Slovic, 2000) and generates an increased probability of 
changing the attitudes of others (Maass & Clark, 1983).  This direct effect corresponds, to 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) subjective norm, Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) peripheral route, and 
Chaiken’s (1987) heuristic processing.  
 
5.3 Research Limitations 
It is important to acknowledge that this study has its limitations. First, the response rate 
for this panel was low (42%) and this raises questions about the generalizability of the results. 
Despite the representation of both sexes, a wide range of ages, education, income, ethnicities, 
and home ownership arrangements, the respondents’ demographic characteristics did not exactly 
mirror the population from which they were drawn (compared with 1990 census data for the 
study communities). However, biases were found in only a few variables and even those were 
not large (Lindell & Prater, 2000). The biases tended to be similar in the two states suggesting 
that there is no net effect on differences in means between states (i.e. the tests of H4 & H5). 
Moreover, as noted earlier, correlation coefficients are resistant to mean bias so tests of the other 
hypotheses (H1, H2, H3, H6, H7, H8, H9 and H10 can be taken at face value). 
Second, this study was a longitudinal panel study aimed at overcoming the limitations of 
cross-sectional designs related to causal inferences; the data was collected only at two points in 
time 1997 and 1999. Although the data made it possible to test the stability of different measures 
including, risk perception, stakeholder characteristics, and adoption of seismic hazard 
adjustment, it would have been richer had it been collected from multiple points in time. This 
may not always be possible from a random sample of the population because of reduction in 
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panel sample size due to migration of an inherently transient population and funding limitations, 
but may need to be looked into for future research. 
Third, the questionnaires were administered during years when no earthquake hit either 
region, possibly reducing the salience of the issue in the minds of the respondents. The same 
questionnaires could be administered to populations in these regions immediately following a 
major earthquake to test for differences in perceptions and adoption of seismic hazard 
adjustments. 
Fourth, the federal, state, and local government influentials were not separated by 
agency name (e.g. FEMA, California/ Washington Governor’s Division of Emergency 
Management, local planning commissions, police department etc.) leading to possible 
unintentional generalizations of perceptions of these stakeholders’ knowledge, trustworthiness 
and responsibility. The same was the case with news media (paper, TV, radio) being generalized 
as one. Future research might want to identify these agencies by name and as individual 
stakeholders and ask specific questions about them. 
 
5.4 Practical Implications 
In addition to its contributions to theory, this study also has practical implications. 
Respondents agreed significantly in their perceptions about the government agencies, especially 
state government being most knowledgeable and trustworthy despite self/family having the most 
responsibility for personal safety. Self-reliance is an admirable trait, but is problematic if people 
are responsible for protecting themselves from hazards they don’t understand. The obvious 
practical solution is for seismic hazard managers and non-governmental organization 
representatives, such as the American Red Cross, to address these needs by providing more 
hazard knowledge to those exposed. Moreover, the data revealed respondents’ lack of confidence 
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about the hazard expertise of their employers, friends and family, so knowledgeable 
organizations should implement hazard education programs to inform employers about seismic 
hazard adjustments. Once this pool is educated and trained they can impart that knowledge to 
their employees. Furthermore, by increasing specific information of the various hazard 
adjustments and their applicability to multiple hazards, and developing a portfolio of incentive 
programs (tax breaks, % APR, loans, installment schemes) that reward adoption can help as well 
(Peacock, 2003). 
The data also indicate that females differ from males in risk perceptions and protection 
responsibility but, nonetheless, have only small differences in hazard adjustment. A better 
understanding of these results will require a gendered perspective (Fothergill, 1996). Hazard 
managers can effect greater improvements in seismic hazard adjustments if they use gender 
mainstreaming—that is, targeting female population segments with specific messages about 
sustainable hazard reduction programs.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 The findings indicate that risk perception, fatalism, personal control, demographic 
characteristics, and city activity in hazard management do not predict hazard adjustment 
processes. Both years’ data showed hazard intrusiveness, hazard experience, and stakeholder 
knowledge, trustworthiness, and responsibility are significantly related to the increased adoption 
of hazard adjustments by households. Particularly important is the role of peer groups’ 
(employers, friends and family) knowledge, trustworthiness and responsibility. These 
stakeholders, which are the closest to oneself in the ‘onion model’ (Godschalk et al., 1994), seem 
to influence households’ actions to take protective actions. The news media, however, was 
perceived to be different from the government agencies and the peer groups and occupied their 
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own ring of influence. This suggests that emergency managers cannot count only on the federal, 
state, and local government advisories put out through the news media to affect households’ 
decisions to adopt hazard adjustments. This would not inform the peer groups adequately. 
Emergency managers need to get to the various service organizations, industrial groups, trade 
unions, neighborhood organizations, and educational institutions to increase the knowledge and 
trustworthiness of all in the peer group. By so doing, they will assure higher household hazard 
adjustment adoption levels, thus facilitating a reduction in post disaster losses and recovery time. 
 
5.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
1. Apply structural equation modeling (LISREL) to the six city panel data by using the 
results from this study to specify the models of interest. This will enable the testing of 
the best model for the stability of perceptions over time that affects seismic hazard 
adjustment adoption behaviors.   
2. Future research needs to address the connection between mass media and authority, and 
if these perceptions have changed after the recent hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
devastations.  
3. Find out if there are differences between those communities that had Community 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and those that didn’t.  
4. We have the household level data for the six cities and we need to do face-to-face 
interviews with local authorities to find out what they think of the hazard adjustment 
processes. This will facilitate the extension of household level data to the local 
government level, which is where the policies are made. 
5. Most of the existing literature on gender and disasters focuses almost exclusively on 
impact and response and is mostly anecdotal. There is a dearth of research data 
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disaggregated by sex for different environmental disaster situations. This needs to be 
pursued. 
6. It will be worthwhile to model the adoption of hazard adjustments by households’ facing 
other natural disasters (e.g. cities along the Gulf Coast bearing the brunt of floods and 
catastrophic hurricanes). Comparing data from these hazards with the present data on 
earthquakes will allow us to find commonalities and differences that will better inform 
policies at the jurisdictional and household levels.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
99Knowledge (Kn)
1. FedKn 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.35 0.38 0.30 0.30
2. StaKn 0.12 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.23 0.40 0.44 0.29
3. LocKn 0.11 0.26 0.45 0.32 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.33 0.48 0.27
4. MedKn 0.15 0.24 0.24 0.40 0.12 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.40
5. EmpKn 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.39 0.29 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.21
6. FrdKn 0.10 0.17 0.27 0.19 0.28 0.40 0.26 0.09 0.23 0.27 0.22
7. SelKn 0.08 0.19 0.29 0.16 0.33 0.36 0.49 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.09
99Trustworthiness (Tr)
8. FedTr 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.27
9. StaTr 0.17 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.13 0.18 0.09 0.39 0.53 0.47 0.35
10. LocTr 0.08 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.39 0.46 0.26
11. MedTr 0.16 0.26 0.17 0.34 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.30 0.42 0.31 0.42
12. EmpTr 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.37 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.25
13. FrdTr 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.25 0.18
14. SelTr 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.33 0.33 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.11
99Responsiblility (Re)
15. FedRe 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.25
16. StaRe 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.26
17. LocRe 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.19
18. MedRe 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.28 0.08 0.09 0.10 -0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.24
19. EmpRe 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.15 0.19
20. FrdRe -0.02 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.24 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.13
21. SelRe 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.20
99Other variables
22.Gender 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08
23.Locat -0.02 -0.26 -0.28 -0.12 -0.17 -0.24 -0.16 0.02 -0.11 -0.21 -0.08
24.Leader 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.18
25.Laggard 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.02
26.PerCo -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.18
27.ResAd -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.06
28.ActLu -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03
29.ActGod -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.06 -0.10
30.HazIn 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.30 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.10
31.HazEx -0.04 0.12 0.19 0.02 0.16 0.24 0.24 -0.13 0.01 0.09 -0.02
32.RiskPe 0.10 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.22 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.18
33.HazAd -0.07 -0.07 0.10 0.04 0.30 0.24 0.39 -0.04 0.02 0.11 0.06
Notes: N's ranged from 198 to 232                                                                                                                                                   
r = 0.18 or greater, significant at the 0.01 level; between r  = 0.13 and 0.17, significant at the 0.05 level.
Fed = Federal government, Sta = State government, Loc = Local government, Med = Media, 
Emp = Employer, Sel = Self/family, Gender = Female (1), Locat =  Washington (1), Leader = Leader City, Laggard = Laggard City,
PerCo = Personal Control, ResAd = Resource Adequacy, ActLu = Act of luck, ActGod = Act God, 
HazIn = Hazard Intrusiveness, HazdEx = Hazard Experience, RiskPe = Risk Perception, HazAdj = Hazard Adjustment Adoption  
Stability Correlations (r)  Between Variables in 1997 and 1999 
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0.16 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.01
0.20 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.14 -0.21 -0.05
0.25 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.15 -0.27 0.03
0.17 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.17 -0.16 0.03
0.44 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.14 -0.12
0.30 0.24 0.24 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.10 -0.33 0.01
0.23 0.24 0.40 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.06 -0.30 -0.04
0.15 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.02
0.18 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.19 0.15 -0.20 -0.03
0.18 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.19 0.21 -0.22 0.02
0.23 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13 -0.05 0.08
0.48 0.29 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.08 -0.16 0.03
0.23 0.38 0.34 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.10 -0.23 -0.06
0.25 0.34 0.46 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.02 -0.18 -0.02
0.08 0.11 0.05 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.16 0.21 0.05 0.16 -0.20 0.01
0.09 0.16 0.09 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.15 0.21 0.10 0.19 -0.20 0.01
0.05 0.12 0.05 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.17 -0.16 0.04
0.05 0.10 0.06 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.48 0.16 0.22 0.01 0.16 -0.07 0.00
0.24 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.39 0.20 0.07 0.17 -0.15 0.01
0.15 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.26 0.06 0.13 -0.22 -0.04
0.24 0.23 0.27 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.31 0.03 -0.08 0.01
-0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.76 0.03 0.00
-0.12 -0.20 -0.18 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 1.00 0.16
0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.16 1.00
0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.42
0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.28 -0.28 -0.33 -0.37 -0.15 -0.19 -0.05 -0.16 0.01 0.03
0.23 0.22 0.29 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.17 -0.15 -0.05 -0.01
-0.03 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.09 0.05 -0.07 -0.05
-0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 0.02 -0.01
0.13 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.06 -0.23 -0.02
0.12 0.20 0.28 -0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.03 -0.56 -0.19
0.13 0.06 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.25 -0.08 0.01
0.26 0.20 0.31 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.12 0.21 -0.09 -0.15 -0.06
Emp = Employer, Sel = Self/family, Gender = Female (1), Locat =  Washington (1), Leader = Leader City, Laggard = Laggard City,
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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
0.05 -0.20 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.16 -0.04
0.12 -0.14 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.19 0.09
0.05 -0.14 0.04 0.04 -0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.10
0.07 -0.29 0.03 -0.04 -0.16 0.06 -0.04 0.13 0.04
0.09 -0.03 0.26 -0.05 -0.09 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.19
0.04 -0.01 0.28 -0.14 -0.08 0.09 0.25 0.01 0.19
0.03 0.03 0.32 -0.12 -0.08 0.27 0.37 0.16 0.31
0.08 -0.12 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.07 -0.05
0.15 -0.07 0.15 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.13 0.08
0.05 -0.06 0.16 -0.03 -0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08
0.03 -0.21 0.13 -0.08 -0.08 0.16 -0.09 0.09 0.03
0.07 -0.06 0.28 -0.04 -0.08 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.14
0.12 -0.13 0.19 -0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.15 0.08 0.09
0.07 -0.10 0.21 -0.08 -0.03 0.24 0.24 0.07 0.21
-0.02 -0.38 -0.15 -0.02 -0.09 0.10 0.04 0.20 -0.04
0.00 -0.36 -0.12 -0.04 -0.11 0.09 0.06 0.18 -0.04
-0.02 -0.36 -0.15 -0.09 -0.15 0.08 0.05 0.15 -0.03
-0.03 -0.36 -0.09 -0.15 -0.21 0.07 -0.01 0.13 0.01
-0.05 -0.20 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 0.10 0.11 0.17 -0.04
-0.02 -0.29 0.06 -0.04 -0.13 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.09
0.04 -0.03 0.14 -0.10 0.00 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.20
0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.13 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.23 -0.02
0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.20 -0.56 -0.09 -0.23
-0.42 0.04 -0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.18 -0.04 -0.07
1.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.08
-0.04 0.40 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.10 0.01 -0.18 0.04
-0.05 0.02 0.56 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.24 -0.10 0.47
0.06 0.02 -0.05 0.50 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.02
-0.01 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.51 -0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.07
0.02 -0.11 0.18 0.04 -0.10 0.35 0.18 0.21 0.27
-0.15 0.03 0.19 0.05 -0.02 0.31 0.77 0.20 0.38
0.02 -0.26 -0.16 0.03 -0.12 0.23 0.04 0.54 0.07
-0.04 -0.02 0.44 0.03 -0.04 0.36 0.35 0.09 0.73
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